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Abstract 
Right-wing adherents in the U.S. and Australia are significantly more likely to deny climate 
change than their left-wing counterparts (Capstick, Whitmarsh, Poortinga, Pidgeon, & 
Upham, 2015; McCright & Dunlap, 2011a; Pew Research Center, 2014; Reser, Bradley, 
Glendon, Ellul, & Callaghan, 2012), making this a politically-polarised issue. However, our 
understanding of the mechanisms that underpin the relationship between political ideology 
and climate change denial is limited. This thesis applies a System Justification Theory 
approach to understand the relationship between types of political ideology and climate 
change denial by examining the mediating role of perceived climate change mitigation threat. 
To do this, community understanding of climate change was explored in an elicitation study 
(Study One) to assist in the construction of a comprehensive measure of climate change 
denial. Following this, a pilot study (Study Two) was conducted to test an existing climate 
change scale that addressed conceptual and measurement issues highlighted by the findings 
of Study One. The next step was to test the System Justification Theory claim that higher 
perceived threat to the socioeconomic system leads individuals, and right-wing adherents in 
particular, to engage in system justification in a general context (Feygina, Jost, & Goldsmith, 
2010). Study Three achieved this by utilising the Dual Process Model of Ideology (Duckitt & 
Sibley, 2010) to explore the differential effects of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) on system justification tendencies. Studies One to 
Three informed the design of the final study (Study Four), which examined the mediating 
effect of perceived climate change mitigation threat on the relationship between our 
multidimensional model of ideology (RWA and SDO) and climate change denial. This study 
found that SDO and the Conventionalism facet of RWA were positively associated with all 
types of climate change denial, and that these relationships were partially mediated by 
climate change mitigation threat. These findings provisionally support the argument that 
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certain right-wing adherents will engage in climate change denial at least in part due to a 
perception that mitigation strategies to combat climate change will threaten the 
socioeconomic status quo.
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Chapter One: Overview of the thesis 
Climate scientists are virtually unanimous in their opinion that climate change is occurring, is 
caused in large part by human behaviour, and will result in serious and dire ecological 
consequences (Anderegg, Prall, Harold, & Schneider, 2010; Cook et al., 2016; IPCC, 2014). 
Despite this, there is a significant discrepancy between the level of scientific consensus and 
ordinary citizens’ climate change beliefs (Doran & Zimmerman, 2009), particularly in the 
UK, Australia, and the U.S., where increases in climate change denial have been observed 
(Capstick et al., 2015).  
As this thesis will show, the issue of climate change is politically-polarised. Political 
conservatives in the U.S. and Australia are significantly more likely to deny climate change 
than their liberal counterparts (Capstick et al., 2015; McCright & Dunlap, 2011b; Pew 
Research Center, 2016; Reser et al., 2012). This is a problem as climate change denial leads 
to a decrease in support for mitigation policies (Dietz, Dan, & Shwom, 2007; O'Connor, 
Bord, & Fisher, 1999; Zhao, Leiserowitz, Maibach, & Roser-Renouf, 2011), and belief in 
climate change could lead to increased support for action (van der Linden, Leiserowitz, 
Feinberg, & Maibach, 2015). However, our understanding of the mechanisms that underpin 
the relationship between ideology and climate change denial is limited.  
Aims and Scope of the Thesis 
Within this context, the aim of this thesis is to apply a System Justification Theory approach 
to understand the relationship between types of political ideology and climate change denial 
by examining the mediating role of perceived climate change mitigation threat. To achieve 
this, the research problem was divided into two overarching steps, to arrive at a final study 
addressing the research aim. This is outlined in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1 Overview of chapters within the thesis 
  
Climate Change Denial: The Effects of Ideological Polarisation and 
Threat
Climate Change Denial -
Conceptual and Measurement 
Issues in Research
(Chapter Two)
Study One – Community 
Understanding of Climate 
Change and Associated Beliefs
(Chapter Three)
Study Two – Climate Change 
Denial Questionnaire 
Development and Pilot Testing
(Chapter Four)
Study Four - Perceived Mitigation Threat Mediates Effects of Right-Wing Ideology on Climate Change 
Belief
(Chapter Seven)
General Discussion 
(Chapter Eight)
A System Justification Theory 
Approach to Ideology and 
Climate Change Denial
(Chapter Five)
Study Three – The Role of 
System Threat in the Right-
Wing Tendency to System-
Justify
(Chapter Six) 
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Structure of Thesis and Organisation of Chapters 
Chapter Two: Climate Change Denial – Conceptual and Measurement Issues in 
Research.  In order to properly understand climate change denial and its determinants it is 
important to explore climate change and climate change denial as they have been represented 
in past studies. This allows for identification of conceptual and measurement issues within 
this body of research that influence the interpretation of findings. In particular, past research 
into climate change denial has been inconsistent in its use of key terminology (e.g. 
interchanging use of global warming and climate change across studies) as well as item 
wording in belief measures. As such, inconsistencies in use of terminology in past studies and 
the different types of climate change denial are detailed.  
Chapter Three: Study One – Community Understanding of Climate Change and 
Associated Beliefs.  As established in Chapter Two, past research into climate change denial 
and its correlates has suffered from problematic conceptualisation and measurement of the 
construct. This includes switching of terminologies between studies (e.g. from global 
warming to climate change), an inconsistent definition of climate change denial (e.g. denial 
of existence, anthropogenic cause, or impact), only measuring one such type of denial at the 
exclusion of others, and measuring climate change denial by conflating it with related 
phenomena in items (e.g. asking participants their beliefs about rising temperatures instead of 
climate change). Ultimately, little formative work to our knowledge has been conducted to 
examine community understanding of climate change as a method to assist the construction 
of a comprehensive climate change denial measure. Study One, detailed in Chapter Three, 
addresses this gap using a belief elicitation approach. 
Chapter Four: Study Two – Climate Change Denial Questionnaire Development 
and Pilot Testing.  Study two tests an existing climate change denial scale that was 
published shortly after the conclusion of the elicitation study (Study One). This scale was 
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selected as it addressed key concerns raised by that study. However, as it was a translated 
scale that had never been used in a sample of participants from an English-speaking country, 
there was a need to first pilot the English translation of the scale.  
Chapter Five: A System Justification Theory Approach to Ideology and Climate 
Change Denial. Following the pilot study, the focus of the thesis shifts to the theoretical 
approach taken to address the main aim of this thesis – To understand the psychological 
underpinnings of the relationship between right-wing ideology and climate change denial. 
Outlined in Chapter Five is the evidence for the link between political ideology and climate 
change denial, and our limited knowledge about what drives denial in right-wing adherents.  
The first step in understanding this relationship is to explore the construct of ideology 
and how it is conceptualised in the social psychology literature. As such, I outline a critique 
of the common unidimensional approach to ideology. Through this Chapter, I advocate for 
the use of a multidimensional ideological model in climate change denial research. This 
ideological model conceptualises ideology as two distinct but related dimensions – Right-
Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), which represents social or cultural conservatism, and Social 
Dominance Orientation (SDO), which represents an economic dimension of conservatism. 
The advantage of this approach is that it allows examination of different ideological paths to 
climate change denial, which adds nuance and complexity to our understanding of denial. 
While this approach has only been used in a handful of climate change belief-related studies, 
those studies have demonstrated that both ideological dimensions may be important in 
predicting climate change denial. These results underscore the merit of using this approach 
for understanding the climate change denial – ideology link. 
I then return to potential explanations for this relationship. One possible explanation 
for the climate change denial – ideology association is that right-wing adherents tend to deny 
climate change as a way to reduce the perceived threat to the socioeconomic system that 
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climate change mitigation poses. This explanation is derived from System Justification 
Theory, which predicts that individuals, and right-wing adherents in particular, will protect 
the status quo when it is under threat. However, the explanatory effect of threat on the right-
wing tendency to system-justify has not been established. Additionally, the effect of climate 
change mitigation threat has not been explored in the relationship between ideology and 
climate change denial.  
Chapter Six: Study Three – The Role of System Threat in the Right-Wing 
Tendency to System-Justify. To establish that perceived threats to the system result in 
heightened system-justifying tendencies in right-wing adherents, Study Three aimed to 
examine the mediating effect of a system threat variable (Belief in a Dangerous World) on 
the relationship between right-wing ideology and two types of system justification tendency 
(economic and general).  Additionally, by adopting the Dual Process Model conceptualisation 
of ideology and comparing a model using self-placement ideological orientation 
(unidimensional model) with two ideological dimensions in RWA and SDO 
(multidimensional model), the study was able to examine whether there are differential 
ideological effects on system justification outcomes, to gather a more nuanced understanding 
of the different ideological underpinnings of the tendency to justify and maintain the status 
quo. 
Chapter Seven: Study Four - Perceived Mitigation Threat Mediates Effects of 
Right-Wing Ideology on Climate Change Belief. The aim of Study Four was to extend 
understanding of the relationship between political ideology and climate change denial by 
examining the mediating role of climate change mitigation threat. This study also used the 
multidimensional model of ideology to examine whether there are differential associations 
between the climate change denial outcomes and two types of ideology (RWA, SDO).  
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Chapter Eight: General Discussion. Chapter Eight concludes the thesis by 
summarising and integrating the findings of the empirical studies. Implications of these 
findings for understanding the politically-polarised nature of climate change denial, 
theoretical implications for System Justification Theory, and the conceptualisation of political 
ideology in social and political psychology research are discussed. 
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Chapter Two: Climate Change Denial – Conceptual and Measurement Issues in 
Research 
Climate Change 
Climate change is defined by the IPCC as “a change in the state of the climate that can be 
identified by changes in the mean and/or variability of its properties, and that persists for an 
extended period, typically decades or longer” (International Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), 2014 p.5). Overwhelmingly, scientific evidence suggests that climate change is 
occurring; is caused in large part by human behaviour; and will result in serious and dire 
ecological and societal consequences (Anderegg et al., 2010; Cook et al., 2016; IPCC, 2014). 
According to the latest IPCC report (IPCC, 2014), climate change will impact natural 
environmental systems, species migration patterns, crop yields and food security. Climate 
change is also expected to lead to: increased heat-related mortality in humans, increased 
vulnerability for the socioeconomically disadvantaged, extreme weather events such as heat 
waves and droughts, and water insecurity (IPCC, 2014). As such, climate change is one of the 
most important and challenging issues facing humanity. Human involvement in climate 
change exacerbation is in large part a function of our reliance on burning fossil fuels for 
energy, which results in harmful greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change 
(IPCC, 2014). The far-reaching implications of continued increases in global average 
temperature means that urgent action is required to mitigate further temperature increases to 
avoid catastrophic and irreversible damage (IPCC, 2014; National Research Council, 2015). 
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Climate Change Denial1 
Despite this, there is a significant discrepancy between the level of scientific consensus and 
ordinary citizens’ climate change beliefs (Doran & Zimmerman, 2009). Worldwide, levels of 
concern regarding climate change were trending upwards until 2007, at which point there was 
a sharp decline followed by a stabilisation in some nations from 2010 (Capstick et al., 2015). 
In particular, the UK, Australia, and the U.S. saw larger increases in climate change denial 
than in other parts of the world (Capstick et al., 2015). According to Saad (2015), around 33 
per cent of United States citizens do not believe that the effects of global warming have 
begun, while 41 per cent believe that global warming is due to natural causes rather than 
human activity. In an Australian sample, 22 per cent of respondents believe that climate 
change is not happening (Leviston, Greenhill, & Walker, 2015), and just under half (46.5%) 
of respondents do not believe that humans are the predominant cause for climate change or 
do not believe that climate change is happening. In sum, a significant number of individuals 
either do not believe that climate change exits, do not believe that it is caused in large part by 
                                                 
 
1 Social psychological literature examining the concept of climate change denial, as has been 
referred to so far in this thesis, is at times also labelled climate change belief (e.g. Bord, 
O'Connor, & Fisher, 2000) and climate change scepticism (e.g. Poortinga, Spence, 
Whitmarsh, Capstick, & Pidgeon, 2011). This thesis will continue to use the term “climate 
change denial”. Although it is acknowledged that not every person denying the existence of 
climate change is necessarily aware of the body of evidence supporting climate change, or 
even understands it at a basic level, and is therefore not deliberately engaging in scientific 
malpractice, the term “climate change denial” is used to refer to a general phenomenon rather 
than the behaviour of specific individuals. Indeed, denial of, or acceptance of, climate change 
will fall upon a continuum, and many people may fall somewhere in the middle and not be 
considered necessarily a sceptic or denier by definition. However, the focus of this research is 
in denial of climate change and not the level of scientific scepticism with respect to the 
specific empirical evidence for climate change. Climate change denial is treated as a variable 
that ranges from low or no denial to high levels of denial. 
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human behaviour, do not believe that it poses problems in the near future, or some 
combination of these (see also Ashworth, Jeanneret, Gardner, & Shaw, 2011).  
 Attitudes toward climate change are politically-polarised. Right-wing adherents in the 
U.S. and Western Europe are significantly more likely to deny climate change than their left-
wing counterparts (Capstick et al., 2015; McCright & Dunlap, 2011b; McCright, Dunlap, & 
Marquart-Pyatt, 2016; Pew Research Center, 2016) and there is evidence of similar effects in 
Australia, such that Liberal/National party voters (two centre-right coalition parties) are more 
likely to deny the reality of anthropogenic climate change the centre-left party voters (Reser 
et al., 2012). Of further concern is the potential for climate change denial to be relatively 
stable among right-wing adherents, as was demonstrated in an analysis of U.S. anthropogenic 
climate change belief data from 2010 to 2015 (Hamilton, Hartter, Lemcke-Stampone, Moore, 
& Safford, 2015).This may indicate that positions on climate change among right-wing 
adherents have hardened somewhat and therefore they may be more difficult to shift.  
Similar polarisation effects also exist at the level of political elites. In Australia,  
Australian Labor Party and Greens politicians (parties considered to be centre-left or 
progressive) were significantly more likely to see climate change as actually happening and 
as a threat to humanity than Liberal/National Party politicians (Fielding, Head, Laffan, 
Western, & Hoegh-Guldberg, 2012). Data from the 2010 Australian Electoral Survey also 
point to significant differences in politician and candidate opinions regarding the severity of 
threat posed by climate change, such that Labor and Greens politicians are more likely to see 
climate change as posing a serious threat to way of life than their Liberal and National party 
counterparts (Tranter, 2013). Worldwide, a review of climate policy in nine Western nations 
found that the United States Republican Party is the only conservative party to be entirely 
averse to climate change mitigation measures (Båtstrand, 2015). As such, the level of 
government response to climate change may differ based on which party or group of parties 
10 
 
is in power, rather than the overwhelming scientific consensus. Furthermore, differences in 
party position on climate change and mitigation is likely intertwined with the polarisation of 
climate change at the level of the voter (Cohen, 2003).  
Understanding beliefs about climate change and their antecedents is important due to 
the effect of these beliefs on support for climate change mitigation. A number of studies 
suggest that climate change denial could lead to a decrease in support for various types of 
climate change mitigation policies (Dietz et al., 2007; O'Connor et al., 1999; Zhao et al., 
2011), and that belief in climate change could lead to increased support for action (van der 
Linden et al., 2015). In support of this, a meta-analysis of climate change belief and its 
correlates (Hornsey, Harris, Bain, & Fielding, 2016) showed that belief in the existence of 
climate change is positively related to policy support (r=.32), support for a carbon tax or cap 
and trade (r=.21) and willingness to prioritise the environment over the economy (r=.38). In 
addition to the evidence linking climate change belief with policy support and environmental 
prioritisation, experimentally increasing levels of perception of scientific consensus 
surrounding climate change was demonstrated to cause an increase in climate change belief, 
which in turn caused an increase in support for public action (van der Linden et al., 2015). 
These findings highlight the importance of understanding climate change denial and its 
antecedents. Furthermore, given that science scepticism is a problem in other areas such as 
health care (e.g. anti-vaccination movements; Black & Rappuoli, 2010), gaining an 
understanding of the psychological underpinnings of climate change denial may also assist us 
in understanding denial or scepticism in other domains where scientific consensus is high.  
Climate Change Denial - Conceptual and Measurement Issues  
In order to properly understand climate change denial and its determinants it is important to 
first explore climate change and climate change denial as they have been represented in past 
studies and the potential limitations that arise and affect interpretation of findings. In 
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particular, past research into climate change denial has been inconsistent in its use of key 
terminology (e.g. interchanging use of global warming and climate change across studies) as 
well as item wording in belief measures. Additionally, existing comprehensive measures of 
climate change denial (e.g. Heath & Gifford, 2006) have been constructed by the researchers 
without formative item development work. This section will provide an overview of these 
key methodological and scale construction issues as they relate to this thesis. 
Climate Change Understanding 
Climate Change vs. Global Warming 
Although causally related, “global warming” and “climate change” are distinct 
phenomena. Global warming refers specifically to surface temperature increases whereas 
climate change is a more general term that refers to the long-term change in the earth’s 
climate (National Research Council, 1979) . These terms are sometimes used interchangeably 
in the climate change denial literature, which could pose a significant problem when 
examining the influence of ideology on climate change denial given partisan differences in 
the perception of, and preferences for, the terms (Akerlof & Maibach, 2011; Schuldt, Roh, & 
Schwarz, 2015). For example, a study of partisan websites (i.e. conservative and liberal 
“think tanks”) found that conservatives were more likely to use the term “global warming” 
whereas Liberal sites tended to use the term “climate change” (Schuldt, Konrath, & Schwarz, 
2011). Interestingly, the same study found that self-identified Republicans are more likely to 
believe that the phenomenon is real when it is termed “climate change” than when it is 
referred to as “global warming” (Schuldt et al., 2011). Additionally, preference for and 
understanding of terms may differ based on nationality and socio-political context. One study 
sampling English participants found that they demonstrated more concern when the term 
“global warming” was used (Whitmarsh, 2009). Despite this, analysis of data from Gallup 
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polls of US participants suggests that there is no statistical difference in patterns of response 
regarding belief when the terms “climate change” and “global warming” are switched 
(Dunlap, 2014), which may reduce the need for concern. Nevertheless, it is difficult to know 
whether this has always been the case, or whether individuals have only just begun to 
understand the terms and how the phenomena relate to each other. Any difference in response 
based on the terms used affects the interpretation of climate change denial survey responses, 
and may also affect interpretation of levels of support for climate change mitigation. Given 
the possibility that the use of these terms may elicit different belief responses, particularly as 
a function of ideology, it would be useful to examine community understandings of both 
terms when considering the use of either in item construction for scales measuring climate 
change beliefs. 
Climate Change as Beneficial 
Differences in understanding of the consequences of climate change across 
individuals and communities means that it can be difficult to accurately and meaningfully 
measure climate change denial. Climate change has not always been viewed as a negative 
phenomenon, particularly in Western culture (Hulme, 2009); it has been suggested that a 
small increase in average global temperature could result in a net benefit to the global 
economy (Tol, 2009), although this is strongly contested (e.g. Pindyck, 2013). Although there 
is a large amount of research on the issue of climate change denial, associated beliefs and 
their correlates, there is little critique with respect to the subjective understanding and 
perception of climate change. Studies of climate change denial are rarely based on formative 
work that examines community perceptions.  
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Types of Denial 
Climate change denial is an umbrella term that encompasses distinct denial types: denial of 
the existence of climate change (e.g. Feinberg & Willer, 2011; Guéguen, 2012); denial of 
anthropogenic (or human induced) climate change (e.g. Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016); and 
denial of climate change impact (e.g. Newport, 2010). Rahmstorf (2004) similarly 
conceptualises climate change “scepticism” as having types: trend sceptics, or those that deny 
the increase in global average temperatures; attribution sceptics (those who doubt that human 
activities are responsible for the upward trend in temperatures); and impact sceptics (who 
focus on potential positive effects of climate change at the exclusion of the negative 
consequences). A fourth type is sometimes used which encompasses denial (acceptance) of 
the scientific evidence for climate change (Feinberg & Willer, 2011; Lewandowsky, 
Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013) or the belief that there is a lack of agreement among scientists 
with respect to climate change (Ding, Maibach, Zhao, Roser-Renouf, & Leiserowitz, 2011). 
Although there is sense in conceptualising and measuring climate change denial as 
three or four distinct (but likely related) types, especially given evidence suggesting that 
some individuals will reject anthropogenic climate change yet acknowledge the existence of 
climate change (Leviston, Leitch, Greenhill, Leonard, & Walker, 2011), many studies only 
focus on one or two types of denial while neglecting the other types (e.g. Feinberg & Willer, 
2011; Guéguen, 2012). The effect is that measuring only one type (or measuring all types as a 
single climate change denial variable) will overlook differences in outcomes between the 
various types of climate change denial and potentially over-simplify conclusions made about 
them. It is also possible that determinants of denial differ based on which type of denial is 
being examined (Poortinga, Spence, Whitmarsh, Capstick, & Pidgeon, 2011). Therefore, 
these types need to be separated and measured as separate aspects of climate change denial to 
avoid these problems. Any measure that intends to capture the breadth of climate change 
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denial in the community needs to examine all types identified in the literature (existence 
denial, anthropogenic denial, impact denial, and science denial) and in a way that minimises 
conflation.  
Conflating Lack of Knowledge with Lack of Belief 
Evidence suggests that understanding and knowledge of the phenomenon of climate change 
can vary (Ashworth et al., 2011; Reynolds, Bostrom, Read, & Morgan, 2010). In studies of 
laypeople’s understanding of climate change, Reynolds et al., (2010) found that many people 
still did not understand the role that increased atmospheric carbon dioxide plays in climate 
change, and how these increases are linked to the burning of fossil fuels. This poses problems 
for scale items that require some level of knowledge of the phenomenon; For example, using 
belief in the link between burning of fossil fuels and aspects of climate change such as 
increases in atmospheric temperature in their items to measure acceptance of climate science 
(Lewandowsky, Oberauer, et al., 2013). While these are objective facts related to climate 
change, it is possible that some individuals may be broadly accepting of climate science 
without understanding the specifics relating to the mechanisms causing climate change, 
especially given the aforementioned findings.  
Measurement of Climate Change Denial 
In sum, and partly as a result of the conceptual issues of climate change previously 
mentioned, a number of problems remain regarding the measurement of climate change 
denial. So far three have been alluded to in particular: 
• Of the climate change denial measures that exist, no study conducted formative work 
(such as elicitation studies) to explore community understandings of, and beliefs 
about, climate change to assist in the construction of scale items. Formative work 
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would enable us to assess the ecological validity of existing scales, or indeed create a 
new climate change denial scale. 
• Often only one type of climate change denial is measured, most commonly denial of 
anthropogenic climate change, even though there is evidence for differences between 
frequency and antecedents across the different types of climate change denial 
(Leviston et al., 2015). 
• Some items are constructed that assume knowledge on the part of participants (e.g. 
Guéguen, 2012) despite evidence suggesting inconsistencies in climate knowledge in 
the general public (Ashworth et al., 2011; Reynolds et al., 2010)  
Additionally, when this thesis commenced, no scale encompassed all four identified 
types of climate change denial (existence/trend, human cause, impact, and science). Only one 
scale was identified that contained the first three denial types (perception of existence, human 
cause, and consequences, Heath & Gifford, 2006). However, while the scale addresses many 
of the concerns raised regarding measurement of climate change denial, it is important that 
any scale developed also includes measures of denial of climate science, given that climate 
science denial, or at least the perception that scientists disagree about climate change, is 
linked to lower levels of support for mitigation (Ding et al., 2011). In sum, any scale that is 
adopted, modified or constructed needs to take into account the four different types of climate 
change denial and should consider ways to address differences in community understanding 
as part of scale development. In order to understand climate change denial we need to 
examine community understandings of and beliefs about climate change and associated 
terms. The next chapter will present an elicitation study conducted to address these demands.  
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Chapter Three: Study One – Community Understanding of Climate Change and 
Associated Beliefs 
As established in the previous chapter, past research into climate change denial and its 
correlates has suffered from problematic conceptualisation and measurement of the construct. 
This includes switching of terms between studies (e.g. from global warming to climate 
change), an inconsistent definition of climate change denial (e.g. denial of existence, 
anthropogenic cause, or impact), only measuring one such type of denial at the exclusion of 
others, and measuring climate change denial by conflating it with related phenomena in items 
(e.g. asking participants their beliefs about rising temperatures instead of climate change). 
Ultimately, to our knowledge, little formative work has been conducted to examine extant 
community understanding of climate change in order to inform the construction of 
comprehensive climate change denial measures. 
As such, this chapter reports on an elicitation study that was conducted to inform the 
construction of items for climate change denial scales. Elicitation studies are designed to 
elicit participants’ salient beliefs about relevant constructs, and involve asking participants to 
describe the construct in a free-response format in order to identify accessible beliefs (e.g. 
Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). The interview responses are then transcribed and coded to examine 
commonalities in responses to specific constructs. These responses can then be used to 
identify salient beliefs related to each construct that may be appropriate for use in 
questionnaire development (Francis et al., 2004; van der Pligt & de Vries, 1998).  For 
instance, asking participants about their beliefs related to the potential impact of climate 
change should elicit a range of responses. These responses can be examined to identify the 
breadth of climate change impact beliefs within the sample. These salient beliefs can then 
inform item and measurement creation. Importantly, this method can identify important 
beliefs that have not previously been reported in a sample.  
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Method 
Participants 
Twenty participants (8 females and 12 males) were recruited online via the social 
media site Facebook. Advertisements asked for people aged 18 years and over. Participants 
made email contact, and were interviewed following the return of a signed Plain Language 
Statement (Appendix A). Ages ranged from 21-63 years (M=27.75, SD=8.74). The majority 
(90%) of participants held a bachelor’s degree or higher (see Table 2).  
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Table 2 Demographic Characteristics of Participants (N = 20) 
 Gender Age (years) Occupation Education Level 
1 Female 24 Student Bachelor’s 
2 Female 23 Student Postgraduate Diploma 
3 Female 22 Student Honours 
4 Male 25 Student Postgraduate Diploma 
5 Female 23 Lab. technician Honours 
6 Male 63 Retired TAFE certificate 
7 Female 30 Student Honours 
8 Male 28 Student Postgraduate Diploma 
9 Male 26 Research assistant Honours 
10 Male 25 Hospital administration Postgraduate Diploma 
11 Male 26 Student Honours 
12 Female 26 Social worker Master’s 
13 Female 27 Scientist Bachelor’s 
14 Male 27 Public servant Master’s 
15 Male 28 Student Bachelor’s 
16 Female 33 Stay-at-home mum Honours 
17 Male 27 School teacher Master’s 
18 Male 21 Student Year 12 
19 Male 26 Public servant Master’s 
20 Male 25 Student Postgraduate diploma 
Recruitment 
Recommendations for sample sizes in similar studies have ranged from 5 to 25 
participants (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006).  The original intention was to recruit a 
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minimum of 20 participants, and although it was deemed that little new information was 
evident by the 15th interview, other interviews were already scheduled to occur and were duly 
conducted as a result. 
Procedure 
A mix of in-person and telephone interviews were conducted. Participants were asked 
their age, gender, current occupation, and highest level of education attained, and then asked 
the schedule of questions found in Table 3 (complete interview materials can be found in 
Appendix D.1). The questionnaire consisted mainly of open-ended questions inquiring about 
salient beliefs and experiences related to climate change. A final question gave the 
participants the opportunity to add any other relevant thoughts on climate change and related 
concepts. Questions were developed to address key concerns outlined in Chapter Two 
pertaining to gaps in understanding of community perceptions of climate change. The first 
two questions attempted to elicit understanding and knowledge about climate change and 
global warming to gauge how participants thought these constructs related to each other, 
given the possibility that the use of these terms may elicit different belief responses. 
Questions pertaining to causes of climate change aimed to elicit understanding of the 
relationship between human behaviour and climate change, or indeed whether the participant 
thought that humans were involved in exacerbating these processes. Importantly, these 
questions would inform the extent to which items pertaining to denial of human cause need to 
be neutral to the underlying mechanisms, such as burning of fossil fuels. The question 
pertaining to consequences similarly sought to gauge community understanding of specific 
impacts of climate change and also just how dire people believe these impacts to be. Again, 
responses to this would inform the amount of neutrality needed in items pertaining to 
measurement of climate change impact denial. Likewise, the item querying beliefs about the 
scientific evidence for climate change sought to understand whether participants had 
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knowledge of the level of scientific consensus and the quality of evidence supporting climate 
change. 
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Table 3 Interview Schedule 
Topic Questions 
Global Warming v Climate change Please describe what comes to mind when you hear the term ‘climate change’ 
Please describe what comes to mind when you hear the term ‘global warming’ 
Denial v Scepticism Please describe what comes to mind when you hear the term ‘climate change denial’ 
Please describe what comes to mind when you hear the term ‘climate change scepticism’ 
Belief in and experience of climate 
change 
What is your belief regarding the existence of climate change?  
Have you experienced anything that you believe might be the result of climate change? If yes, please 
describe this/these experience(s). 
Causes  What do you think might be the cause or causes of climate change? 
Do you believe that humans are the cause of climate change? If yes, to what extent? 
Consequences Do you believe that climate change will lead to dire consequences? If yes, please describe. 
Scientific evidence What are your thoughts regarding the nature of the scientific evidence surrounding climate change? 
Exploratory questions Do you feel empowered to do anything about climate change? 
What are your impressions of the media representation of the issue of climate change? 
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Analysis 
Following the elicitation interviews, all interviews were transcribed verbatim and reviewed 
for quality control. Data from the elicitation study was analysed using thematic content 
analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2013). Coding of responses to each question was performed using 
NVivo version 10 software. Common responses and themes to the interview questions are 
shown in Table 4.  
Results and Discussion 
Table 4 (below) shows the commonly elicited responses from interviews with participants, 
grouped according to relevant constructs and the proportion of participants who provided a 
response coded within this theme.  
Table 4 Elicited responses in order of commonality for each relevant construct, and percent of 
participants responding with these responses 
Theme Subtheme Responses % of 
participants 
Climate Change 
v. Global 
Warming 
Climate Change Increase/change in temperature 50% 
Carbon emissions 35% 
Global warming 25% 
Environmental disasters (e.g. 
floods, droughts, bushfires) 
20% 
Melting ice caps 15% 
Greenhouse gases 15% 
Global Warming Increase/change in temperature 25% 
A part of climate change 20% 
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Theme Subtheme Responses % of 
participants 
Less “accurate” than climate 
change 
15% 
Greenhouse gases/effect 15% 
Climate change Belief Definitely occurring  70% 
Probably occurring 5% 
Ambivalent 10% 
Sceptical 15% 
Definitely not occurring 0% 
Experiences Hotter summers 40% 
Extreme weather 20% 
Environmental disasters 20% 
Shifting of seasons 10% 
None 30% 
Causes Types Carbon emissions/pollution 90% 
Deforestation 25% 
Resource consumption 25% 
Methane 10% 
Natural climate fluctuations 15% 
Extent of human 
involvement 
Majority humans/exacerbated 
natural process 
70% 
Only humans 10% 
Mostly natural 5% 
Completely natural 5% 
25 
 
Theme Subtheme Responses % of 
participants 
Unsure 5% 
Consequences Rising sea levels 35% 
Reduction in habitable areas 20% 
Food supply effects 15% 
Ecosystem damage 10% 
Extreme weather 10% 
Environmental disasters 10% 
Yes, nonspecific 15% 
None, or no immediate effects 15% 
Scientific evidence Strong consensus 65% 
Still debated 5% 
Exaggerated 5% 
Sceptical 5% 
Ambivalent 5% 
Unsure 10% 
 
Understanding of Climate Change and Global Warming 
Some participants believed these two concepts were more or less referring to the same 
issue, global warming being “pretty much the same thing” as climate change. However, many 
also saw global warming as a part of climate change, or a “less accurate” way to describe the 
same phenomena, citing that variance in temperate occurs in both directions rather than just 
warming.  
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Participants typically mentioned concepts relating to the effects of climate change. 
Rising temperatures were cited in discussions around both climate change and global 
warming, although climate change appeared to elicit more references to adverse 
consequences, such as “melting ice caps” and “bushfires”. With respect to potential causal 
factors, participants often thought of “carbon emissions” and “greenhouse gases” when 
thinking about climate change, and “greenhouse gases” with respect to global warming. 
However, participants were more forthcoming in general while considering climate change 
than when considering global warming, although it is possible that this was due to the effect 
of question ordering. Participants had already had the opportunity to mention these concepts 
with respect to climate change, so some may have felt as though they needed to respond to 
the global warming question with respect to their response to the previous climate change 
question, rather than focusing on global warming independently. In support of this, 15% of 
participants characterised global warming as a less accurate description of the phenomenon, 
or a term that is imprecise and superseded by a more accurate description in climate change 
and 20% thought global warming was a part of a broader climate change phenomenon. This 
would appear to indicate that opting to use the term “climate change” in measurement items 
is preferable, as it is a term that individuals may more readily identity as the proper and 
precise label for the phenomenon.  
Climate Change Beliefs – Existence, Causes, Impacts 
While most participants believed in the existence of climate change, there was less 
consensus within the cohort regarding the causes of climate change (and in particular the 
level of human involvement), as well as the resulting impacts. The next subsections will 
discuss the findings with respect to perceived causes of, and impacts of, climate change.  
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Causes of Climate Change and Extent of Human Involvement 
The overwhelming majority of participants identified carbon emissions and the 
burning of fossil fuels as a major cause of climate change. Most participants acknowledged 
that climate change is a natural occurrence, although they typically noted that humans have 
exacerbated the change through the use of fossil fuels. One participant indicated that they 
believed climate change was a mostly natural occurrence with some human involvement, 
while another believed that it was entirely naturally-caused. Finally, one participant 
expressed uncertainty as to the causes of climate change.  
Few participants explicitly described the link between fossil fuel emissions and 
climate change. While most appeared to understand that increases in these emissions lead to 
increases in climate change, only a small number of participants made the further step to 
describe the process by which these emissions lead to increasing temperatures and climate 
change. While it is possible that participants simply did not include the extra step of 
explaining causation even though they are aware of it, it is also possible that they only 
understand the relationship between carbon emissions and climate change at a general level. 
That is, the use of fossil fuels (or the increase in carbon emissions) somehow results in an 
increase in climate change, without understanding the processes by which these occur. This 
suggests that any items based on specific knowledge about climate change causes to measure 
belief in anthropogenic climate change could be problematic. 
Consequences of Climate Change 
The question relating to participants beliefs regarding the consequences of climate 
change drew the highest level of disagreement and differentiation in opinion, ranging from 
“climate change is already causing issues” to beliefs that “claims are exaggerated” or that 
effects would not be felt for a very long time. Most participants (85%) believed that climate 
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change will cause extreme consequences for the planet and for humanity, citing events such 
as increased heat, drought, famines, floods and the submerging of low-lying areas. Some of 
these participants believed that climate change is already having a serious impact on the 
environment. Twenty percent of participants felt that the consequences will not be as bad as 
scientists or the media are suggesting. Two participants thought that while the consequences 
are potentially catastrophic, humans will “find a way to adapt”. Some admitted that they 
simply did not know whether climate change is likely to bring about serious consequences for 
humanity and for planet Earth. Fifteen percent showed low concern, and even disbelief in the 
possibility of catastrophic consequences.  
Some participants acknowledged a level of personal ignorance on the issue. Those 
that did were less in line with the scientific consensus, believing that while anthropogenic 
climate change is plausible, that its effects are exaggerated.  
“I guess because there is a lot of scare-mongering I don't really know like 
to what extent to believe how bad the situation actually is. Because I don't 
read a lot about it, so I don't, I don't really know what all the scientists are 
saying as such, but I just umm, I just sort of think yeah if we don't make 
changes then it possibly will have dire consequences that, I don't know, I'm 
not sure if it will get to that point.” 
 The varied responses to this question demonstrate the need for a multi-item scale that 
measures beliefs about the existence of climate change, anthropogenic climate change, and 
climate change impact as separate factors. While most participants were of the opinion that 
climate change is occurring, there was less agreement regarding its impacts, suggesting that 
measuring only belief in climate change occurrence would overestimate population consensus 
on the issue.  
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Personal Experience of Climate Change 
Participants were generally unsure about whether they had experienced any weather 
or environmental phenomena related to climate change. Some said that it is not possible to 
have a personal experience of climate change due to climate change being a subtle and long-
term change. When participants offered possibilities of related experiences, hotter weather 
was most common. Bushfires, droughts, and the recent Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines 
were also mentioned (n.b. these are listed under the category of “environmental disasters” in 
Table 4).  
Although some participants were willing to draw the possible causal link between a 
tangible phenomenon such as a drought or a bushfire, it appeared that participants were 
cautious in their approach to this question. This may be due to a reluctance to draw inferences 
between climate change and personally-experienced phenomena due to a level of uncertainty. 
In particular, given that the sample was relatively highly educated, there might be a tendency 
to avoid drawing causal links to particular phenomena without a higher standard of evidence.  
With respect to questionnaire item development, this may suggest that avoiding specific 
mentions of climate change-related phenomena is advisable given the range of responses and 
the possibility of healthy scientifically-minded scepticism regarding links between specific 
and tangible weather events such as droughts, bushfires and floods, and the predicted increase 
in such weather events in climate change models.  
Impressions of Scientific Research and Debate 
Most participants admitted to a level of ignorance with respect to the detail of the 
scientific research and claims surrounding climate change. However, most appeared to trust 
the science, if not explicitly, then implicitly through their belief in anthropogenic climate 
change. Most appeared to understand that there is little debate amongst scientists regarding 
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the human role in climate change, although those who were more sceptical of climate change, 
and anthropogenic climate change in particular, were of the view that the climate change 
debate was not settled among scientists. 
Key Considerations for Scale Development 
The findings highlighted above lead to three important recommendations for the development 
of a climate change denial scale. These include:  
• Use the term “climate change” instead of “global warming” - Given that some 
participants saw global warming as a component of climate change, and a less 
accurate descriptor of the phenomenon, the term “climate change” appears more 
suitable to use, and any questionnaire should consistently adopt this terminology. This 
is also consistent with the technical definitions of this term where climate change 
encapsulates the consequences of rising temperatures (global warming). 
• Avoid Knowledge-Based Items - Although participants could identify that fossil fuel 
use and carbon emissions are major factors in the cause of climate change, few 
participants explicitly identified the mechanisms that connect the two. As a result, 
scales should avoid using knowledge about the mechanisms underlying climate 
change as an indicator of belief in climate change.  
• Create Climate Change Denial Sub-factors - Not all participants believed that 
humans contribute to the phenomenon of rising temperatures, while some believed 
that climate change is a term that implies a phenomenon caused by humans. 
Furthermore, there were mixed reactions with respect to the impacts of climate 
change and perceived risk. This would appear to suggest that only asking about the 
existence of climate change is likely to result in misleading outcomes that are difficult 
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to meaningfully interpret. A multifactorial measure of climate change denial is 
therefore required. 
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Chapter Four: Study Two – Climate Change Denial Questionnaire Development and 
Pilot Testing 
After the completion of the elicitation study described in the previous chapter, a study 
reporting the use of a new climate change denial scale was published (Häkkinen & Akrami, 
2014). This scale appeared to address the considerations raised via the findings of the 
elicitation study (see items in Table 5, page 35). It used the term “climate change” as opposed 
to “global warming”, and did so consistently without switching between the terms. The 
wording of the items did not rely on technical knowledge on the part of the participant, 
except for the most general concepts (for instance, general increase in temperature as an 
effect of climate change). Finally, the scale appeared to be suitable for use as a multifactorial 
measure of climate change denial. It includes items pertaining to denial of the existence of 
climate change, denial of human cause of climate change, denial of climate change impacts, 
and additionally denial of science and scientific evidence for climate change.  However, this 
measure was initially written in Swedish, and so a pilot study was conducted of the English 
translation2 for use in the third study of this thesis; data for this study was collected in 2015.  
Aim 
The aim of the pilot study was to examine item variance, interfactor correlations, and 
scale reliability of the English translation of the climate change denial scale (Häkkinen & 
Akrami, 2014). 
                                                 
 
2 We are appreciative to Kirsti Jhyla (née Häkkinen) for giving us access to a preliminary translated version of 
the scale 
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Method 
Participants 
A total of 67 participants completed all items in the pilot study. Participants were 
aged between 18 and 75 years (Mage = 30.90, SD = 12.95) and indicated their gender as 
female (n=46), male (n=20) or other (n=1). The number of participants in this study is in 
excess of the recommended minimum of 30 participants for pilot studies with the intention of 
measurement development, and to obtain internal consistency statistics (Johanson & Brooks, 
2010). These participants were recruited via social media platform Facebook. 
Materials 
Climate Change Denial Scale (See Table 5 for pilot study scale items) was a scale 
designed by Häkkinen and Akrami (2014) to capture different forms of denial. The original 
scale included 20 items, however one item was removed prior to pilot testing within this 
study. That item (“The temperature on Earth varies naturally”) was removed due to concerns 
about its specific wording and the possibility that it would be a poor discriminator between 
deniers and those who accept anthropogenic climate change. It is possible that believers 
would agree with the statement at similar levels to deniers, as it is accurate to suggest that 
there are natural fluctuations in temperatures. It was felt that the wording of this item was not 
specific enough and too ambiguous.  
The scale consists of four subscales: existence denial, human cause denial, impact 
denial, and science denial.  
Analyses Conducted 
Item means and standard deviations were obtained and reliability analysis was 
conducted using SPSS Statistics Version 22. The aim of obtaining these statistics was to 
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examine floor and ceiling effects in the items, variance in each item (means and standard 
deviations), and overall scale reliability (Cronbach’s α).  
Results and Discussion 
Item Statistics 
Table 5 includes the means and standard deviations for all items within the Climate 
Change Denial scale after reverse coding of relevant items. Means for all items are below the 
mid-point of the scale, however some items showed relatively large variance. Low scores on 
a climate change denial scale should be unsurprising given that the majority of the population 
do not deny anthropogenic climate change.  
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Table 5 Means and Standard Deviations for items in Climate Change Denial Scale 
Item 
Number 
Item Mean SD 
1 I am not convinced that the Earth’s climate has warmed up 
over the last century. 
2.04 1.63 
2 I find it hard to believe that the Earth’s climate is really 
changing. 
1.51 .98 
3 My opinion is that Earth’s climate shows a pronounced 
increase in temperature.* 
2.45 1.51 
4 I believe that climate change is occurring.* 1.61 1.01 
5 Climate change is a result of human activities such as burning 
fossil fuels.* 
2.00 1.18 
6 Climate change is just a result of natural variation in the 
climate. 
3.21 1.52 
7 Warming of the climate on Earth is not due to human 
influence. 
1.79 .95 
8 Human activity is causing changes in the climate.* 1.76 .96 
9 Climate change will affect the Earth negatively.* 2.01 1.32 
10 Climate change will not affect life on Earth in any significant 
way. 
1.63 .97 
11 My opinion is that we will not even notice the effects of 
climate change. 
1.63 .94 
12 The so-called “climate threat” is exaggerated. 2.04 1.39 
13 The seriousness of climate change is exaggerated in the 
media. 
2.18 1.52 
14 A few degrees here or there in climate change will not affect 
life on Earth. 
1.87 1.19 
15 Many people underestimate the seriousness of climate 
change.* 
2.10 1.36 
16 I do not believe that scientists are in agreement on the issue of 
climate change. 
3.12 2.02 
17 I believe that there is enough scientific evidence to confirm 
the changes in Earth’s climate.* 
1.84 1.14 
18 I think the evidence for climate change is far too weak. 1.94 1.19 
19 Scientific evidence overwhelmingly supports the notion that 
the climate is changing.* 
2.10 1.26 
Note: * indicates the item was reverse coded. All items range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree).
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Table 6 Inter-item correlations for the Climate Change Denial Scale 
Item 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
2 .50*                  
3 .16 .50*                 
4 .43* .92* .53*                
5 .24* .59* .36* .70*               
6 .25* .40* .43* .45* .58*              
7 .24* .54* .26* .61* .73* .54*             
8 .22 .51* .25* .65* .82* .56* .80*            
9 .19 .35* .16 .37* .63* .52* .46* .59*           
10 .35* .62* .31* .67* .48* .35* .54* .62* .47*          
11 .29* .53* .25* .64* .63* .42* .66* .76* .52* .83*         
12 .28* .60* .36* .71* .69* .52* .57* .66* .44* .65* .77*        
13 .32* .61* .39* .71* .63* .51* .57* .67* .45* .72* .75* .86*       
14 .18 .52* .25* .58* .54* .36* .55* .58* .39* .72* .76* .66* .70*      
15 .37* .60* .32* .63* .51* .39* .48* .49* .34* .48* .51* .64* .62* .51*     
16 .06 .38* .21 .42* .48* .31* .30* .36* .22 .26* .31* .45* .34* .33* .20    
17 .28 .73* .52* .83* .66* .46* .50* .66* .40* .58* .60* .65* .59* .51* .51* .50*   
18 .31 .76* .50* .85* .65* .42* .54* .64* .31* .59* .62* .65* .63* .53* .51* .57* .85*  
19 .21 .64* .42* .73* .67* .45* .57* .65* .41* .51* .58* .56* .54* .44* .45* .54* .84* .88* 
Note. *p<.05 
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Subscale statistics 
The means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alphas, and interfactor-correlations for all 
subscales are reported in Table 7. 
Table 7 Bivariate correlations, means, standard deviations and Cronbach’s alphas for the 
Climate Change Denial scale and subscales 
 1 2 3 4 M SD α Items 
1. Total scale     2.04 .90 .94 1-19 
2. Existence Denial Subscale .81    1.90 .99 .75 1-4 
3. Human Cause Denial Subscale .87 .58   2.19 .99 .87 5-8 
4. Impact Denial Subscale .92 .64 .77  1.92 1.01 .91 9-15 
5. Science Denial Subscale .84 .62 .66 .64 2.25 1.21 .86 16-19 
Note. All correlations significant at p<.05 
Cronbach’s alphas for total scale and all subscales indicate good inter-item reliability. The 
subscale correlations suggest that while they are positively related and strongly correlated (as 
expected), they are still distinct constructs. This offers preliminary support for the scale’s use 
as a multifactorial measure of climate change denial. However, to confirm this, a 
confirmatory factor analysis was conducted as part of statistical analyses conducted in Study 
Four (see Chapter Seven). 
Changes Made to Climate Change Denial Scale for Study Four  
Some items in the original Climate Change Denial scale were changed or removed based in 
part on the findings from this study. As such, items 10, 13, and 15 were omitted, and the 
wording of item 14 was changed to omit mention of “degrees” alluding to temperature 
change so as to adhere to earlier concerns regarding knowledge of climate change.  
Item 10 “Climate change will not affect the life on Earth in any significant way” was 
omitted due to a large correlation with item 11 (r=.83). Item 11 “My opinion is that we will 
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not even notice the effects of climate change” was favoured as it did not specify the effects of 
climate change, allowing more scope for the participant to consider possible climate change 
impacts. Item 10 narrowed the field of impacts to “life on Earth”, which perhaps reduces 
considerations to climate change impacts humans, animal species and the natural 
environment, which while broad and important in and of itself, does not allow for the 
possibility of participants viewing climate change as impacting on society, economics and 
other human systems. 
Item 13, “The seriousness of climate change is exaggerated in the media” was 
removed due to its focus on perceptions of the media coverage of climate change, which 
while interesting and valuable, was not the direct focus of the final study, and was the only 
item in the original scale mentioning media. 
Item 15 “Many people underestimate the seriousness of climate change (reverse-
coded)” focuses on participant’s perceptions of other people’s level of climate change impact 
denial rather than their own. As this item was the only item to do so, it was removed to keep 
the focus of items on participant’s personal beliefs. 
Conclusion 
Findings from this pilot study broadly support the continued use of the scale as a 
multifactorial measure of existence denial, human cause denial, impact denial, and science 
denial. As mentioned above, some changes were made to the finalised scale to be used in 
Study Four. This finalised scale can be found in Appendix D.4 in Study Four Questionnaire 
Materials. 
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Chapter Five: A System Justification Theory Approach to Ideology and Climate 
Change Denial 
Chapter Summary 
The aim of this chapter is to advance a System Justification Theory approach to 
understanding the right-wing tendency to deny climate change. In doing so, I will first 
summarise findings that right-wing ideological adherents are more likely to deny climate 
change than their left-wing counterparts, and that ideology moderates other variables that are 
otherwise thought to counteract denial such as level of education and understanding of 
climate change. Through this, two key issues emerging from the literature on the ideology-
climate change denial relationship are highlighted: the need for a nuanced approach to 
ideology; and the limited understanding of what drives this relationship based on existing 
theory and empirical literature.  
By way of exploring the first issue, existing conceptualisations of ideology are 
described along with the issues and inadequacies with the common unidimensional 
conceptualisation of ideology. Through this, I propose the application of a multidimensional 
ideological model: the Dual Process Model of Ideology (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). I argue that 
applying this model will improve our understanding of the underlying ideological drivers for 
climate change denial.  
To address the second issue, I propose that the ideology-climate change denial 
relationship might be explained by a tendency to perceive climate change mitigation as a 
threat to the socioeconomic system. This is referred to as the Mitigation Threat Hypothesis 
throughout. The Mitigation Threat Hypothesis is developed from System Justification 
Theory, which predicts that individuals, and right-wing adherents in particular, are more 
likely to engage in behaviours and beliefs that protect the system when they perceive a threat 
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to it. From this, existing evidence for the role of perceived system threat in system-justifying 
behaviours generally is appraised, as well as evidence supporting the Mitigation Threat 
Hypothesis itself. Finally, the rationale for two further studies that seek to address limitations 
in the literature by: (1) testing the System Justification Theory claim that threats to the system 
drive the system justification tendency in right-wing adherents; and (2) testing the Mitigation 
Threat Hypothesis.  
The Role of Ideology in Climate Change Denial 
Extensive research has investigated the determinants and correlates of climate change denial. 
A recent meta-analysis by Hornsey, Harris, Bain & Fielding (2016) summarised this body of 
research and identified a number of demographic factors that predict higher levels of climate 
change denial:  
• Male gender 
• Increased age 
• Lower income 
• Lower education level 
• White ethnicity 
• Right-wing political party affiliation 
• Conservative ideological orientation 
 
Of these, political affiliation (self-reported affiliation with a political party) and ideology 
(typically self-reported on single dimension liberal/conservative) were the two strongest 
demographic predictors of climate change denial (Hornsey et al., 2016). In addition, the 
meta-analysis identified a number of important psychological predictors (or antecedents) of 
climate change denial. These included: 
• Objective and subjective climate change knowledge 
• Trust in scientists 
• Perceived scientific consensus 
• New Ecological Paradigm 
• Activist/green identity 
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• Biospheric values 
• Individualistic and hierarchical cultural values 
• Free-market ideology 
• Experience of extreme weather 
• Experience of local weather change 
• Environmental cues 
Importantly, other studies have found that political affiliation and ideology not only correlate 
with climate change beliefs, but also moderate the influence of other significant demographic 
and psychological variables. For example, political affiliation moderates the relationship 
between educational attainment and climate change beliefs (Hamilton, 2011). More educated 
Republicans show the same or lower levels of climate change concern than less educated 
Republicans, whereas the relationship between education and concern is positive for 
Democrats with climate change concern increasing as education increases (Hamilton, 2011; 
Hamilton et al., 2015).  
Highlighting the importance of political variables in understanding climate change denial, 
variables that generally decrease level of denial, such as climate change knowledge (Malka, 
Krosnick, & Langer, 2009), general science knowledge (Hamilton, Cutler, & Schaefer, 2012), 
science literacy (Kahan et al., 2012), and climate change consensus information (Cook & 
Lewandowsky, 2016) only do so for liberals and Democrats. These variables have no effect 
on levels of denial for conservatives and Republicans, and in some cases actually increase 
levels of denial for these right-wing adherents. This is of significant concern to climate 
scientists, science communicators and environmental advocates, who may believe that 
presenting climate sceptics and deniers with scientific facts about climate change will result 
in an increase in belief and concern about climate change. These findings stress the 
importance of the need to understand the underlying factors involved in right-wing denial of 
climate change.  
42 
 
 
 
Overall, many determinants of climate change denial are implicitly or explicitly linked to 
ideology, and many of these predictors appear to operate differently for left-wing party 
affiliates compared to right-wing party affiliates, and liberals compared to conservatives. It is 
important to note that, despite evidence of partisan influences on climate change denial, 
ideology appears to be a more appropriate variable to investigate than simple party 
allegiance.  
Firstly, party affiliation differs across nations, and conclusions drawn about Republicans 
and Democrats are not necessarily amenable to application in other national political 
contexts. Although most developed democracies have major centre-right and centre-left 
parties, the political contexts differ such that seemingly comparable parties differ in their 
ideological focus, and may be more or less conservative or liberal than a similar party from 
another nation. For example, centre-right parties in Australia, France and the United 
Kingdom support, to varying levels, centre-left policy initiatives such as paid maternity leave 
and basic universal healthcare, which puts them at odds with their centre-right counterparts in 
the United States. On the other hand, ideology is cross-culturally and temporally superior in 
that it is not as bound by cultural, political, or temporal context in the same way that political 
parties are. Ideological values are represented across cultural and political contexts (Krauss, 
2006; Van Hiel & Kossowska, 2007), and the concept of left-wing and right-wing ideological 
positions have been represented for some two-hundred years (Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008) 
making ideological variables more generalizable across time.  
Secondly, party identification (defined as “a long term, affective, psychological 
identification with one’s preferred political party”, p. 2) is declining in many democratic 
nations (Dalton, 2016), meaning that focusing only on party identifiers excludes a growing 
proportion of the population that identifies as independent. Unlike party identification, 
ideological polarisation is increasing rather than in decline (Pew Research Center, 2014). To 
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add to this, there are psychological effects that are specific to partisans and not present in 
non-partisans, such as partisan motivated reasoning effects (Taber & Lodge, 2006), that may 
affect their attitudes in other political or scientific domains in ways that are not found in non-
partisans (Dalton, 2016).  
Taken together, this body of research suggests that political ideology is worthy of further 
investigation with respect to its role in climate change denial. As such, this chapter will focus 
on the role of ideology, how it has been examined in climate change denial research, and 
whether a new approach to ideology will help us further understand climate change denial. 
Conceptualisations of Ideology 
Ideology is a complex concept that appears to have several different definitions and 
understandings that differ both between and within social science disciplines (Gerring, 1997). 
Providing a detailed discussion of these definitions is not within the scope of this thesis, 
however it is important to outline the approach that will be taken, and what aspects of 
ideology will and will not be included in this body of work. This thesis will apply a 
conceptualisation of political ideology that is common in social and political psychology 
research, which views it dimensionally (i.e. left-right) and as a function of roughly coherent 
social and economic political beliefs held by the individual. This is in line with definitions 
offered by political scientists such as Heywood (2012) who defines ideology as “a more or 
less coherent set of ideas that provides the basis for organised political action, whether this is 
intended to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing system of power” (p. 11). Similarly, 
Converse (1964) defined it as “a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements 
are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence” (p. 207). While 
these definitions of ideology encapsulate both “classical” ideological traditions (e.g. 
liberalism, conservatism, and socialism) and “new” ideologies (e.g. feminism, religious 
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fundamentalism, and ecologism; Heywood, 2012), the focus of this thesis will be on the 
relationship between classical ideological positions and climate change denial.  
Dimensionality of Ideology 
As mentioned, most studies linking climate change denial to political ideology conceptualise 
ideology as a unidimensional construct ranging from left to right (or liberal to conservative) 
on the political spectrum (See Figure 2). Liberal or left-wing adherents typically value 
equality, social justice (Feldman, 2013) and individual freedom (Freeden & Stears, 2013). 
Conservative or right-wing adherents on the other hand tend to value tradition, hierarchical 
social structures, and unequal distributions of power (Feldman, 2013; Jost, Federico, & 
Napier, 2009). Proponents of the unidimensional approach argue that it is parsimonious (e.g. 
Jost et al., 2009) and that multidimensional models are only disentangling two dimensions 
(social and economic conservatism) that are interrelated and share common psychological 
antecedents, such as higher levels of uncertainty and threat (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & 
Sulloway, 2003). However, evidence from political psychology research suggests that the 
unidimensional approach fundamentally misrepresents ideology (Feldman, 2013) and as such 
undermines research into its relationship with climate change denial. The following 
subsections will outline the issues with the unidimensional approach; examine evidence 
supporting the use of a multidimensional conceptualisation of ideology; and discuss studies 
into climate change denial that have operationalised ideology in two dimensions.  
 
Figure 2 Unidimensional model of ideology 
Left/Liberal Centrist/Moderate Right/Conservative 
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Problems with the Unidimensional Approach 
Although widely used and appealing in its simplicity, this unidimensional approach is 
problematic for a number of important reasons. This subsection will identify some key 
limitations of this approach. 
Firstly, studies examining the dimensionality of political beliefs show that the left-
right unidimensional model is flawed and lacks empirical support. As Feldman notes, “A 
large number of studies, spanning well over 50 years, have examined the dimensionality of 
political beliefs and issue preferences among people in many different countries. In virtually 
no case is a single factor (left-right) model an adequate fit to the data” (2013, p. 595). In sum, 
psychological antecedents differentially predict social and economic preferences (Feldman, 
2013), suggesting that these ideological dimensions are psychologically distinct (n.b. the 
extent to which a multidimensional approach to ideology resolves this issue is discussed in 
more detail below). 
A related issue is that the meaning of “moderate” on a unidimensional scale is 
ambiguous. Research suggests that those who self-identify as moderate on such measures are 
not exclusively centrists, but also individuals with a combination of equally extreme, but 
counterpoised liberal and conservative views (Klar, 2014; Treier & Hillygus, 2009). As a 
result the unidimensional scale is unable to separate true moderates from individuals such as 
libertarians. Indeed, it is not uncommon for individuals to adopt right-wing economic 
attitudes along with left-wing social attitudes (in the case of libertarians), and vice versa 
(Feldman & Johnston, 2013), which means that it is difficult for individuals to place 
themselves on a unidimensional ideology scale. 
Use of these types of unidimensional self-placement measures of ideology also 
ignores the evidence that the terms used as anchors (namely conservative/liberal) are 
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themselves value-laden. This could lead individuals to avoid identification with a particular 
ideology due to perceived negative connotations, despite possibly holding attitudes and 
values congruent with that ideology (Ellis & Stimson, 2012). For example, Schiffer has 
argued that individuals who identify as conservative Democrats appear to have values that are 
more liberal than they indicate themselves to be when using self-placement items. He has 
suggested that this apparent inconsistency may arise out of reluctance to self-identify as 
“liberal” due to the often derogatory use of that term during and after the Reagan years 
(Schiffer, 2000). This apparent inconsistency can also arise due to inconsistent understanding 
of ideological labels. People may identify with conservatism and liberalism but differ on their 
understandings of these concepts with respect to policy content (Feldman & Johnston, 2013); 
There is evidence that some may identify as conservative despite supporting liberal positions 
(Zell & Bernstein, 2013). 
Another complication of the unidimensional model is the inconsistency of ideological 
beliefs domains across levels of political sophistication (Converse, 1964). Only politically 
sophisticated partisans, or individuals who are highly politically engaged and with high 
political knowledge, tend to coherently polarise along the liberal-conservative continuum 
(Feldman & Johnston, 2013). The relationship between economic and social ideological 
domains increases as sophistication increases (Feldman & Johnston, 2013). Therefore, the 
unidimensional approach may not be appropriate for those low in sophistication, and 
according to Converse (1964) this accounts for the vast majority of the voting population.  
Indeed, it is these limitations that led Feldman to argue that “Although politicians, 
philosophers, and social scientists often discuss politics as if it were organized on a single 
left-right dimension, 50 years of research on public opinion shows that a unidimensional 
model of ideology is a poor description of political attitudes for the overwhelming proportion 
of people virtually everywhere” (Feldman, 2003, p.477). Consideration of the limitations of 
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unidimensional approaches to understanding and measuring ideology has led political and 
social psychologists to recommend the use of multidimensional models of ideology.  
Multidimensional Models 
Multidimensional models of ideology conceptualise ideology as made up of multiple 
distinct, but often related, dimensions – typically with one dimension representing economic 
equality, preference for hierarchy, and self-interest (economic ideology), and a second 
referring to a preference for tradition, social order above social change, and individual 
freedom (social ideology; Feldman, 2013). Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of 
this multidimensional ideological space. For example, Jost et al., (2003) defines conservative 
ideology as constituting high levels of both resistance to change and acceptance of inequality. 
Resistance to change refers to preferences for traditionalism and an opposition to challenges 
to the existing social, cultural and political order (Jost et al., 2003), and is conceptually 
similar to the conservative end of social ideology. Acceptance of inequality refers to the 
perception that hierarchy is inevitable in society (Jost et al., 2003) and is conceptually similar 
to the conservative end of economic ideology.  
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Figure 3 Ideology matrix representing two ideological dimensions of political ideology 
(economic on horizontal axis and social on vertical axis). 
 
 This thesis will adopt the Dual Process Model (DPM) of ideology, which is a 
multidimensional model that operationalises social ideology (resistance to change) as Right-
Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), and economic ideology (acceptance of inequality) as Social 
Dominance Orientation (SDO) (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009), and views these 
variables as representing relatively distinct ideological attitude dimensions (Duckitt & Sibley, 
2009). RWA represents an individual’s tendency to submit to authority, a tendency to 
commitment to norms and conventions of society, and a preference for authority to punish 
deviants and norm violators (Altemeyer, 1998). SDO represents a preference for inequality, 
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intergroup hierarchy and group dominance (Ho et al., 2015; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & 
Malle, 1994). RWA and SDO have been respectively shown to be strongly correlated with 
other indices of social and economic ideological dimensions (Caprara & Vecchione, 2013).  
Psychological Distinctiveness of the Two Ideological Dimensions 
The DPM posits that SDO and RWA are founded in different core beliefs about the 
social world. Those high in SDO tend to see the world as a ‘competitive jungle’ while those 
high in RWA tend to see the world as a ‘dangerous place’ (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). A recent 
meta-analysis supported this contention, demonstrating divergent correlations with these 
types of beliefs; Dangerous worldview beliefs were more strongly related to RWA (r=.41) 
than SDO (r=.17) whereas the reverse was true for competitive worldview beliefs, such that it 
was correlated with SDO at .55 and RWA at .19 (Perry, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2013). This 
evidence for the DPM argument that these ideological dimensions may arise from different 
core beliefs about the social world, provides impetus to treat these as different psychological 
constructs.  
Additionally, RWA and SDO have different associations with key personality traits.  
For example, in a large New Zealand sample (N=6,886) Big Five personality trait 
agreeableness was significantly and negatively related to SDO (r = -.32) but not RWA. The 
authors explain that people with low levels of trait agreeableness are more likely to be self-
interested and hedonistic, and have a heightened sensitivity to competitive situations (Perry & 
Sibley, 2013). Trait conscientiousness (a trait representing levels of organisation, 
dependability, reliability, and thoroughness; Goldberg, 1993) significantly and positively 
related to RWA (r = .14) but not SDO (Perry & Sibley, 2013). Findings from an earlier meta-
analysis by Sibley and Duckitt (2008) are consistent with this pattern of findings, with 
agreeableness negatively correlated with SDO (ranging from -.26 to -.38 depending on the 
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Big Five scale used) but not RWA, and conscientiousness positively correlated with RWA 
(.10 to .19) but not SDO.  
Further supporting the psychological distinctiveness of RWA and SDO, the two 
ideological variables differentially map on to values from the Schwartz Value Survey 
(Schwartz, 1992). Values are defined as general or abstract beliefs that serve as guiding 
principles for individuals (Feather & McKee, 2012). RWA is positively related to an array of 
values emphasising tradition (respect for customs and ideas provided by the traditional 
culture), conformity (adherence to social norms and the restraint in behaviours likely to 
violate them), and security (safety, harmony, stability of society). By contrast, while SDO is 
also positively related to security, it differs in that it is positively correlated with values of 
power (social status, prestige, dominance over others and resources), achievement (personal 
success through demonstration of competence according to social standards), and hedonism 
(pleasure and self-indulgence), which are largely uncorrelated to RWA (Feather & McKee, 
2012).  
These political ideology dimensions have also been mapped on to moral foundations. 
Moral Foundations Theory proposes five universal moral foundations that are grouped into 
two superordinate categories of morality; individualising foundations, which relate to more 
traditional concepts of morality such as social justice, and are captured by harm/care and 
fairness/reciprocity dimensions; and binding foundations, which work to maintain in-group 
relations, such as in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity (Haidt & Graham, 
2007). RWA is positively associated to the binding foundations and unrelated to the 
individualising foundations. SDO, however, is negatively related to individualising 
foundations and only weakly (although positively) related to the binding set (Milojev et al., 
2014).  
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In sum, as well as distinguishing between the conventional left-right spectrum, RWA 
and SDO are underpinned by different sets of personality and values variables that highlight 
their distinctiveness as ideological dimensions. Those high in RWA are likely to be high in 
personality trait conscientiousness, and they value tradition, conformity, security, authority, 
and in-group loyalty, and view the world as a dangerous place. On the other hand, those high 
in SDO are likely to view the world as a competitive jungle, have lower trait agreeableness, 
are more likely to be self-interested and hedonistic. They also value power, social status, 
personal achievement, and have lower levels of moral concern regarding social justice. These 
personality and values differences between the two ideological variables highlights the need 
for the use of multidimensional models such as the DPM over unidimensional models that are 
unable to capture the unique variance underpinning conservative ideology. 
Utility of a Multidimensional Ideological Approach 
Multidimensional models such as the DPM are advantageous as they adequately solve 
the issues of the unidimensional approach discussed above. They can be used to characterise 
ideological positions that exist on the more simplistic left/right unidimensional model but can 
also account for other ideological positions that are mischaracterised within this 
unidimensional approach, such as libertarianism and communitarianism (Feldman, 2013; 
Klar, 2014; Swedlow, 2008). They avoid the issue of so-called cross-pressured individuals 
responding as moderate when they may in fact be extreme on both social and economic 
dimensions but in opposite directions (Treier & Hillygus, 2009). For instance, libertarian 
ideology can be characterised as having high levels of economic conservatism but low levels 
of social conservatism, and due to this a libertarian would find it difficult to place themselves 
meaningfully along a unidimensional continuum (as previously argued).  
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Importantly, multidimensional models of ideology also accommodate for cross-
cultural differences in ideology. Although it is typical to find that the two dimensions 
positively correlate in Western democracies, ideological research in Eastern European and 
post-communist nations find that the two dimensions are sometimes negatively correlated 
(Van Hiel & Kossowska, 2007). This suggests that normative ideological alignment in these 
nations is different to Western nations, and highlights the importance of socio-political 
context in the formation of ideology (de Regt, Mortelmans, & Smits, 2011). Importantly in 
the context of climate change, cross-cultural differences in the meaning of left-right 
identification suggest that an understanding of climate change denial outside of Western 
political contexts is made difficult without a multidimensional approach. McCright, Dunlap 
and Marquart-Pyatt (2016) found no left-right ideological divide with respect to belief in 
climate change and support for mitigation in eleven former communist countries sampled, 
which they attribute to differences in the meaning of left-right identification in the post-
communist context. 
Use of Dual Process Model in CCD Research 
In addition to the concerns raised regarding the unidimensional model, as well as the 
established benefits of adopting a multidimensional approach, the DPM appears to be a 
particularly useful conceptualisation of ideology to assist in identifying the underlying 
ideological motivators to climate change denial. The DPM asserts that while high RWA and 
high SDO will often result in the same political outcomes, the underlying motivations for 
these outcomes will differ (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). For example, both high RWA and high 
SDO may predict support for right-wing political parties or policies. Those high in RWA may 
be drawn to such a political party or policies as a way to serve needs relating to 
traditionalism, conventionalism and social conservatism. Whereas, those high in SDO might 
be drawn to the same party/policies due to their attraction to economically conservative 
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policy positions and a tendency to prefer group inequality. The ability to distinguish between 
different underlying motives for political positions may be useful in the context of climate 
change denial to allow a nuanced understanding of why different types of right-wing 
adherents will engage in denial. Even if both RWA and SDO positively and uniquely predict 
variance in climate change denial outcomes, they may do so for different reasons.  
Indeed, studies have found that RWA and SDO are significant ideological predictors of 
climate change denial (Häkkinen & Akrami, 2014; Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016; Milfont, 
Richter, Sibley, Wilson, & Fischer, 2013; Stanley, Wilson, & Milfont, 2017), and despite 
being correlated, often predict variance in denial over and above one another, at least in 
Western contexts. Although SDO was the only significant predictor of climate change denial 
out of the two ideological variables in one study (Häkkinen & Akrami, 2014), both SDO and 
RWA have been shown to uniquely explain variance in climate change denial (Milfont et al., 
2013). RWA and SDO were also independent predictors of denial through an 
environmentalist threat mediator (that is, perceived threat to society, tradition, and the 
economy posed by environmentalists; Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016). In sum, the findings 
regarding the contributions of RWA and SDO could suggest the possibility of different right-
wing ideological pathways to climate change denial, highlighting the merit in the continued 
examination of the effects of the two ideological paths of the multidimensional model on 
climate change denial. 
The Mitigation Threat Hypothesis – System Justification Theory  
While evidence consistently suggests that right-wing ideological adherents of all types are 
significantly more likely to deny climate change than their left-wing counterparts (e.g. 
Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016), the reason for this relationship is not well understood. One 
possibility, derived from System Justification Theory (SJT), is that right-wing adherents deny 
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climate change to resolve threats to the system that are presented by climate change 
mitigation policies (see Figure 4). Indeed, past research points to the possibility that climate 
change denial is a system-justifying behaviour due to demonstrated relationships between 
system justification behaviours and tendencies and climate change denial or denial of 
environmental problems (Feygina et al., 2010; Hennes, Nam, Stern, & Jost, 2012), and group 
threat and climate change denial (Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016). This novel hypothesis that 
right-wing climate change denial occurs because climate change mitigation poses a threat to 
the socioeconomic system will be referred to throughout this thesis as the Mitigation Threat 
Hypothesis. This section will provide an outline of SJT as well as the rationale for the 
Mitigation Threat Hypothesis. We will also address a lack of empirical evidence for the role 
of threats to the system in the right-wing tendency to system-justify. This chapter will 
conclude by outlining two studies that will attempt to deal with these limitations – one that 
examines the mediating effect of perceived system threat on the relationship between right-
wing ideologies and system-justifying tendencies, and another that examines the specific 
mediating effect of climate change mitigation threat on the relationship between right-wing 
ideologies and climate change denial.  
 
 
Figure 4 Hypothesised mitigation threat mediation of right-wing ideology and climate 
change denial 
Right-wing 
Ideology 
Climate Change 
Denial 
(System 
justifying 
behaviour) 
Mitigation Threat 
(System Threat) 
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System Justification Theory  
SJT suggests that people are motivated to varying degrees to actively defend the 
existing social system from threats, even when doing so can harm individual and group 
interests (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; van der Toorn & Jost, 2014). In this context, “system” 
can refer to social, economic, or political arrangements in which individuals and/or groups 
exist (van der Toorn & Jost, 2014). The term “system justification” refers to behaviours that 
work to actively defend the system, or tendencies to perceive the system as legitimate and 
stable (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Jost et al., 2008). According to SJT, system justifying beliefs 
and behaviours are motivated by situational and dispositional factors (van der Toorn & Jost, 
2014) such as situational threats to the system (Ullrich & Cohrs, 2007; Wakslak, Jost, & 
Bauer, 2011), and heightened dispositional needs to reduce threat (Hennes et al., 2012). As a 
result, the theory predicts that perceived threats to the system increase the likelihood that 
people will engage in system-justifying behaviours as a way to reduce these threats (Kay & 
Friesen, 2011). Importantly, it is expected that this will occur irrespective of whether or not 
these behaviours contradict individual or group interests (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). When 
applied to climate change, System Justification Theory suggests denial occurs in response to 
the perception that climate change mitigation policies (such as carbon taxes and moving to a 
clean energy economy) pose a threat to the system (Feygina et al., 2010). Denying the 
problem removes the need for the threatening solution, and therefore actively supports the 
existing socioeconomic status quo. 
Studies examining the system justification motivation have found that political 
conservatives are more prone to system-justifying tendencies (Jost et al., 2008) and 
behaviours (e.g. Feygina et al., 2010). With respect to the Dual-Process Model, SDO (Martin 
et al., 2014; Mosso, Briante, Aiello, & Russo, 2013) and RWA (albeit a weak relationship; 
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Osborne & Sibley, 2014) are also positively related to system-justifying tendencies. Based on 
SJT, this is suggested to be due to a heightened system threat perception on the part of right-
wing adherents (Onraet, Van Hiel, Dhont, & Pattyn, 2013) and therefore a heightened need to 
reduce perceived threat (Hennes et al., 2012). However, evidence for this hypothesis is 
lacking, and no study has examined the explanatory role of system threat on the relationship 
between right-wing ideology and system-justifying tendencies. 
The Effect of Threat on System-Justifying Outcomes 
SJT defines system-justifying behaviours as behaviours that work to bolster and 
support the system when it is under threat (Jost et al., 2004). The theory predicts that “both 
chronic and temporary elevations” in needs to reduce threat will be associated with stronger 
needs to justify the system (Hennes et al., 2012, p. 672). Experimental research evidence 
suggests that threat manipulations, such as reminding participants of recent terrorist attacks or 
questioning the stability of the national political system, can trigger increases in how fair and 
legitimate an individual perceives the prevailing system (Ullrich & Cohrs, 2007; Wakslak et 
al., 2011), an outcome variable which is measured by the General System Justification scale 
(Kay & Jost, 2003). General system justification (defined as the tendency to perceive the 
prevailing social system as fair, legitimate, and justifiable), as well as economic system 
justification (defined as the tendency to legitimise economic inequality), are also positively 
correlated with threat measures such as death anxiety (Hennes et al., 2012). Threat 
manipulations also lead to behaviours that maintain the social status quo, such as victim 
derogation and victim enhancement processes (Kay, Jost, & Young, 2005), and 
complementary stereotyping (Jost, Kivetz, Rubini, Guermandi, & Mosso, 2005). As such, 
climate change denial may be a system-justifying behaviour insofar as the existence of 
climate change is associated with system-threatening mitigation solutions. In this 
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conceptualisation, downplaying climate change acts as a system justifying behaviour as it 
also downplays the need to change the system. 
The Relationship between Threat and Right-Wing Ideology 
For the Mitigation Threat Hypothesis to be plausible there is a need to establish that 
right-wing adherents are prone to heightened system threat perception as well as the need to 
reduce that threat. This positive relationship between threat perception and right-wing 
ideology is well-established and supported by a large amount of correlational and 
experimental evidence. Numerous studies point to a positive relationship between right-wing 
ideologies and the tendency to have heightened existential threat such as mortality salience, 
fear of death, and Belief in a Dangerous World (see Jost et al., 2003 for a meta-analysis). It 
appears that right-wingers have a heightened bias to negative and threatening stimuli 
(Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2014) and are more sensitive to threat than their left-wing 
counterparts (Lilienfeld & Latzman, 2014).  
A more nuanced approach to the link between threat and right-wing ideology 
separates threat types into two broad categories: internal and external. Internal threats are 
threats that exist in the private sphere of the individual and are only experienced by that 
individual, such as death anxiety (Jost et al., 2003). On the other hand, external threats are 
defined as “ideological threats that stem from society, which pose a danger not only to 
oneself but also to society as a whole” (Onraet et al., 2013, p. 233). Although both broad 
threat types positively relate to right-wing ideology, external threats are shown to be more 
important in understanding the antecedents of right-wing ideologies as well as its effects on 
the right-wing tendency to system-justify (Onraet et al., 2013). External threats can have 
situational and dispositional (that is, the predisposition to experience higher levels of external 
threat) components (Onraet et al., 2013), and this thesis will focus on the latter. An example 
of a dispositional external threat variable is Belief in a Dangerous World (Duckitt, Wagner, 
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du Plessis, & Birum, 2002) which is demonstrated to have stronger relationships with RWA 
and SDO than internal threat variables (Onraet et al., 2013). With respect to the context of 
this thesis and the adoption of an SJT approach to understanding climate change denial in 
right-wingers, external threat variables such as Belief in a Dangerous World will be referred 
to as system threat variables.  
In support of the dispositional system threat – ideology relationship, Jost et al. (2007) 
found that a single system threat item, measuring “way of life” concerns about terrorism, was 
positively related to conservative political orientation. Additionally, another system threat 
variable, political uncertainty (a threat variable relating to the level of personal uncertainty 
about the future of the socio-political system), was shown to positively correlate with RWA 
but not SDO (Shaffer & Duckitt, 2013). This evidence suggests that right-wing adherents are 
prone to heightened system threat perception, and given their tendency to have heightened 
levels of system justification, they may be prone to engage in system justification as a result 
of system threat in accordance with SJT (Kay & Friesen, 2011). However, no known study 
has examined the mediating effect of dispositional system threat on the relationship between 
right-wing ideology and system justification, therefore it is not known whether system threats 
are the route to system-justifying behaviours and tendencies among right-wing adherents.  
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
The previous sections have covered evidence suggesting that right-wing adherents are 
more prone to heightened system threat perception and are more likely to engage in system-
justifying behaviours, however it is not known whether system threat explains the 
relationship between right-wing ideology and system justification in the general sense. It is 
important to first establish the theoretical underpinnings of the Mitigation Threat Hypothesis 
by testing mediation models that test whether system threat accounts for the right-wing 
tendency to system justify. The study presented in Chapter Six tests two such mediation 
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models: one with a unidimensional conceptualisation of ideology, and one utilizing the DPM 
to examine possible differential ideological effects. 
Past research points to the possibility that climate change denial is a system-justifying 
behaviour due to demonstrated relationships between system justification behaviours and 
tendencies and climate change denial (Feygina et al., 2010; Hennes et al., 2012), and threat 
and climate change denial (Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016). However, no study has examined 
whether right-wing adherents perceive mitigation to be a threat to the socioeconomic status 
quo, and accordingly whether this mediates the relationship between right-wing ideology and 
climate change denial. The study described in Chapter Seven examines the mediating effect 
of climate change mitigation threat on the relationship between right-wing ideology and 
climate change denial by employing a measure of climate change mitigation threat. This 
study also compares a unidimensional ideological model with a multidimensional DPM 
approach.  
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Chapter Six: Study Three – The Role of System Threat in the Right-Wing Tendency to 
System-Justify 
Abstract 
Although right-wing adherents are more prone to heightened system threat perception and are 
more likely to engage in system-justifying behaviours, it is not known whether system threat 
explains the relationship between right-wing ideology and the tendency to system-justify. 
Prior to testing the Mitigation Threat Hypothesis it is important to first establish the 
theoretical underpinnings of the ideology–system justification relationship. As such, the aim 
of this study was to examine the explanatory role of a system threat variable (Belief in a 
Dangerous World) on the relationship between ideology variables (ideological orientation, 
Right-wing Authoritarianism, and Social Dominance Orientation) and system justification 
tendencies. Participants (N = 205) were recruited via Facebook. Although, RWA, SDO and 
right-wing ideological orientation were positively associated with all types of system 
justification tendencies as well as Belief in a Dangerous World, mediation effects were not 
found. As a result, this study does not support the System Justification Theory argument that 
heightened chronic threat perception leads to system-justifying tendencies in right-wing 
adherents. Implications of this, particularly for the Mitigation Threat Hypothesis, are 
discussed. 
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Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined a key component of SJT, that right-wing adherents are more 
prone to heightened system threat perception, and are more likely to engage in system-
justifying behaviours. However, no study has examined the explanatory effect of individual 
differences in subjectively-perceived levels of system threat on the relationship between 
right-wing ideology and system justification. Furthermore, no study has examined this effect 
using a multidimensional conceptualisation of ideology such as the Dual Process Model of 
ideology (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). This chapter reports on a study that examined the 
explanatory role of a system threat variable (Belief in a Dangerous World) on the relationship 
between ideology variables and system justification tendencies. This is an important step in 
examining the feasibility of the system justification approach in understanding the 
relationship between ideology and climate change denial. As detailed in the previous chapter, 
right-wing adherents may deny climate change insofar as they perceive climate change 
mitigation to be a threat to the system (Mitigation Threat Hypothesis). Understanding the role 
of individual differences in system threat at the general level, and its effect on ideology and 
system justification, helps us examine the potential for a specific type of system threat in 
mitigation to be a relevant factor in the right-wing tendency to deny climate change. Belief in 
a Dangerous World was chosen as it is conceptualised as a social world, or system threat 
perception variable (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Onraet et al., 2013), distinct from internal 
threats such as death anxiety.  
The Present Research 
This study aimed to examine the mediating effect of a system threat variable (Belief in a 
Dangerous World) on the relationship between right-wing ideology and two types of system 
justification tendency (economic and general). Second, by adopting the Dual Process Model 
conceptualisation of ideology, the study is able to examine whether there are differential 
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ideological effects on system justification outcomes, to gather a more nuanced understanding 
of the different ideological underpinnings of the tendency to justify and maintain the status 
quo. 
Consistent with past research demonstrating a positive relationship between right-
wing ideology and system justification tendencies (Hennes et al., 2012; Jost et al., 2008), 
right-wing ideological orientation as well as RWA and SDO was predicted to relate to both 
general and economic system justification (hypothesis one). Furthermore, given past research 
demonstrating similar relationships between threat variables and system justification types 
(Hennes et al., 2012), it was predicted that Belief in a Dangerous World would be positively 
related to both types of system justification (hypothesis two). Finally, based on SJT, which 
suggests that system threat leads individuals, and right-wing adherents in particular, to justify 
the system, it was predicted that Belief in a Dangerous World would: (a) mediate the positive 
relationship between ideological orientation and system justification in the unidimensional 
model (hypothesis three); and (b) mediate the relationship between the ideological 
dimensions RWA and SDO and system justification in the multidimensional model 
(hypothesis four).  
Additionally, given that RWA and SDO could differentially predict system 
justification outcomes, as well as be differentially mediated by Belief in a Dangerous World, 
an aim of this study was to compare the multidimensional model of ideology with the 
unidimensional model to determine whether it would: (i) Explain more variance system 
justification; and (ii) whether the two dimensions of ideology differentially associated with 
Belief in a Dangerous World and system justification types.  
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Method 
Participants 
Two hundred and five participants (133 female, Mage = 33.17, SD = 13.51, range = 18-
72) were recruited via social media platform Facebook. Eighty-one per cent of the sample 
had completed or were completing a university degree. Our sample leaned left-wing 
ideologically, with 60% identifying as left-leaning, compared to 18% identifying as 
conservative-learning, and 21.5% scored at the midpoint of the single-item self-report scale. 
The sample was largely Australian in nationality (93%). 
Materials3 
Participants completed an online survey responding to questions relating to 
demographic information (age, gender, level of income, level of education), questions 
relating to political party identification and voting behaviour, as well as responding to the 
scales detailed below. 
Economic System Justification (ESJ; α = .84) – This 17-item scale measures “the general 
ideological tendency to legitimise economic inequality” (Jost & Thompson, 2000, p. 225). 
This scale is widely used in system justification research, with higher scores indicating a 
heightened tendency to justify the economic status quo.  
                                                 
 
3 The Need for Closure (NFC) scale was originally included in the questionnaire as a measure of epistemic 
uncertainty. This is because System Justification Theory predicts that both heightened threat and uncertainty 
drive needs to justify the status quo. However, this measure was excluded from the final analysis after a 
confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated that the five sub-factors of the NFC scale did not all positively 
correlate with one another as suggested in the original scale development study. In fact, one sub-factor was 
significantly negatively related to other sub-factors, and others were not significantly related at all. Furthermore, 
given that the final study of this thesis was examining the mediating role of climate change mitigation threat, the 
decision was made to exclude the NFC uncertainty measure and focus exclusively on the role of threat in the 
relationship between ideology and system justification.  Given the theoretical considerations of the role of 
epistemic uncertainty in system justification, it may be worth examining uncertainty in future studies, however 
with a more reliable measure. 
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General System Justification (GSJ; α = .81) – This eight-item scale measures “perceptions of 
fairness, legitimacy, and justifiability of the prevailing social system” (Kay & Jost, 2003, p. 
828). Higher scores indicate a stronger perception that the current social system is fair and 
justifiable. 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; α = .92) – The 22-item RWA scale represents socio-
cultural ideology dimension and measures the tendency toward authoritarian and traditionalist 
attitudes, with higher scores indicating a greater tendency toward preference for authority, 
submission to authority and traditionalism. It is a unidimensional construct that contains three 
content clusters: Authoritarian aggression, authoritarian submission, and traditionalism 
(Altemeyer, 1998). 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; α = .93) – The 16-item SDO scale represents the 
economic ideology dimension. Higher scores indicate a preference for hierarchy and 
inequality in intergroup relations (Pratto et al., 1994). 
Belief in a Dangerous World (BDW; α = .83) – The ten-item Belief in a Dangerous World 
scale measures the extent to which an individual believes that “the social world as a 
dangerous and threatening place in which good, decent people’s values and way of life are 
threatened by bad people”, with higher scores indicating stronger beliefs in this direction 
(Duckitt et al., 2002, p. 78). This variable has been used in past research as a dispositional 
system threat variable (Onraet et al., 2013). 
Ideological orientation: single-item 11-point self-placement measure assessing an 
individual’s ideological orientation on a scale ranging from 0 (left) to 10 (right). Higher 
scores on this scale indicate a more conservative or right-wing orientation. 
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Analytic Strategy 
All analyses were conducted using SPSS 23 and AMOS 23 statistical software. All 
descriptive statistics and zero-order correlational analyses were conducted in SPSS, while 
path analyses were tested in AMOS. Multiple imputation was conducted to replace missing 
values in the dataset. Seventy-six participants had missing data on at least one scale item, and 
less than 1% of the overall data was missing. Hypotheses 1 to 4 were tested via two 
mediation models using maximum likelihood estimation. The two models were identical 
except that the first model utilised the single-item self-placement measure of political 
ideology (unidimensional model) and the second model measured ideology by the constructs 
RWA and SDO (multidimensional model). Bootstrapping was used to test the significance of 
the indirect paths. 
 
Figure 5 Hypothesised system threat mediation of ideology variables (ideological 
orientation in the unidimensional model, and RWA and SDO in the multidimensional model) 
and system justification types (general and economic). 
 
To examine the relative effects of a single versus multidimensional approach to 
ideology on system justification types, we compared the unidimensional and 
multidimensional models for (i) variance explained and (ii) differential effects of ideology. 
Ideology variables 
•  
System Justification 
Types 
 
System Threat  
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For the multidimensional model, RWA and SDO were tested simultaneously as independent 
variables, with Belief in a Dangerous World as the sole mediator. General and Economic 
System Justification were all tested simultaneously as outcome variables, and were all 
allowed to intercorrelate. The multidimensional ideological model also allowed us to examine 
the differential effects of our ideology measures (RWA and SDO) on our outcome variables. 
Results 
Bivariate Correlations 
In support of past research, ideological orientation, RWA and SDO were all positively 
associated with both General and Economic System Justification outcomes (Hypothesis 1), as 
well as the Belief in Dangerous World mediator (Hypothesis 2). Belief in a Dangerous World 
was not significantly associated with General System Justification, although it was positively 
associated with Economic System Justification (See Table 8). 
Table 8. Bivariate correlations and descriptive statistics for all variables in the 
unidimensional and multidimensional models 
 1 2 3 4 5 Range M SD 
1. Ideological Orientation      0-10 3.74 2.06 
2. Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism 
.60*     1-9 2.32 1.12 
3. Social Dominance 
Orientation 
.46* .55*    1-7 2.16 0.96 
4. Belief in a Dangerous 
World 
.31* .53* .28*   1-7 3.15 1.03 
5. General System 
Justification  
.44* .29* .40* -.11  1-9 4.69 1.33 
6. Economic System 
Justification 
.57* .53* .59* .27* .51* 1-9 3.99 1.14 
*p<.01 
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System Threat Mediation 
Total, direct, and indirect effects for ideology variables on all outcome variables for 
the unidimensional and multidimensional models are shown in Table 9 (see Appendix C.1 
and C.2 for graphical representations of unidimensional and multidimensional path models 
respectively). Hypothesis three was not supported; the positive relationship between the 
ideological orientation item and the two system justification outcomes was not mediated by 
Belief in a Dangerous World in the unidimensional model. Hypothesis four was also not 
supported; there was no indirect effect on economic system justification for either of the two 
predictors, and no indirect effect on general system justification for SDO. In all cases, the 
size of the total and direct effects were close to identical. The effect of RWA on General 
System Justification increased in the mediation model, however the interpretation of this is 
problematic given that Belief in a Dangerous World and General System Justification are 
uncorrelated at the zero-order level.
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Table 9 Standardised effects decomposition for unidimensional model and multidimensional model, predicting outcome measures 
 General SJ  95% CI Economic SJ  95% CI BDW  95% CI 
Unidimensional Model R2=.26  R2=.33  R2=.10  
Ideological Orientation       
Total effect .44* (.06) [.32, .56] .57* (.05) [.46, .66] .31* (.07) [.16, .43],  
Direct effect .53* (.06) [.41, .63] .53* (.06) [.41, .64]   
Indirect effect -.09* (.03) [-.15,-.04] .03* (.02) [.00, .08]   
Belief in a Dangerous World (mediator)       
Total effect -.27* (.07) [-.39,-.14] .11 (.06) [-.01, .22]   
Multidimensional Model R2=.26  R2=.41  R2=.28  
Right-Wing Authoritarianism       
Total effect .09 (.07) [-.04, .24] .28* (.06) [.17, .40] .54* (.07) [.40, .66] 
Direct effect .29* (.07) [.14, .44] .29* (.07) [.15, .43]   
Indirect effect -.19* (.05) [-.29,-.11] -.00 (.04) [-.07, .07]   
Social Dominance Orientation       
Total effect .35* (.07) [.19, .48] .44* (.07) [.29, .56] -.01 (.08) [-.17, .13] 
Direct effect .35* (.07) [.19, .47] .44* (.07) [.29, .56]   
Indirect effect .01 (.03) [-.05, .07] .00 (.01) [-.01, .01]   
Belief in a Dangerous World (mediator)       
Total effect -.36* (.07) [-.49,-.21]  -.00 (.07) [-.13, .13]   
BDW: Belief in a Dangerous World, SJ: System Justification *p<.05 Standard errors in parentheses.
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Comparison of Ideological Models 
Variance explained in general system justification was similar across both models, 
however the multidimensional model explained more variance in economic system 
justification, as shown in Table 10. The multidimensional model also explained more 
variance in the mediator (Belief in a Dangerous World) than the unidimensional model, 28% 
to 10% respectively. 
Table 10 Percent variance explained (R2) in outcome variables (and mediator) by 
predictor variables for the unidimensional model and the multidimensional model. 
Outcome variable Unidimensional 
Model 
Multidimensional 
Model 
General System Justification 26% 26% 
Economic System Justification 33% 41% 
Belief in a Dangerous World 
(mediator) 
10% 28% 
 
The multidimensional model allows us to compare differential ideological effects on system 
justification variables (see Table 9 for effects decomposition). SDO had significant direct 
effects on both system justification outcomes, however RWA had significant direct effects on 
economic but not general system justification.  
Discussion 
The overall aim of the study was to examine the theorised role of system threat in the 
association between right-wing ideology and system justification tendencies. Additionally, 
the study compared the differential effects of RWA and SDO on system justification 
outcomes in the multidimensional mediation model.  
As predicted, and broadly consistent with past research (Hennes et al., 2012; Jost et 
al., 2008) all zero order correlations between RWA, SDO, ideological orientation, and 
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general and economic system were positive and significant. However, while the system threat 
variable (Belief in a Dangerous World) was positively related to all ideology variables and 
economic system justification, its relationship with general system justification was not 
significant. This was unexpected given that system justification theory predicts that higher 
dispositional threat perception should lead to a tendency to justify the system as a way to 
reduce threat, and past research has demonstrated a positive link between general system 
justification and threat (Hennes et al., 2012). The hypotheses (three and four) that Belief in a 
Dangerous World would mediate the relationship between the ideological variables and the 
two system justification types in the respective models were not supported. Belief in a 
Dangerous World did not mediate the relationships between ideological orientation and both 
types of system justification, and the indirect effect of ideological orientation and General 
System Justification via Belief in a Dangerous world was negative; however, this effect was 
small. Similarly, Belief in a Dangerous World did not mediate the relationship between SDO 
and system justification types, or RWA and economic system justification. Belief in a 
Dangerous World negatively mediated the relationship between RWA and general system 
justification, however again the effect was small.  
These findings do not support the SJT prediction that right-wing adherents are more 
likely to have higher system justification tendency due to heightened levels of system threat 
perception. Although our findings demonstrate that right-wing adherents are higher in system 
justification tendency, and are more likely to perceive the world as a dangerous place, this 
threat perception did not explain the right-wing tendency to system-justify. According to 
these findings, dispositional threat perception may not explain the right-wing tendency to 
justify and support the system, contrary to SJT (Hennes et al., 2012). While individual 
differences in levels of system threat perception appear relevant for those high in RWA in 
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particular, the tendency of right-wing adherents to system-justify may fall to other as yet 
unexplored factors.  
A key difference compared to other studies examining the effect of threat on system-
justifying tendencies was the use of the system threat variable Belief in a Dangerous World, 
which had not been used as a mediating variable in the ideology – system justification 
relationship in previous studies. This variable measures the perception of the social world or 
system as unstable, out of control, and existentially threatening. Therefore, while it is still 
surprising that this threat measure did not significantly relate to general system justification at 
the zero order level, given that SJT predicts existential threat perception leads to system-
justifying tendencies and behaviours, it is plausible that those who perceive society as 
threatening to the individual may wish for system change to address these dangers. It is 
possible that those high in RWA with high system threat, who favour a harsher approach to 
threatening and socially deviant individuals and groups (Gerber & Jackson, 2013), may 
believe that key system-maintenance actors such as the police and the justice system broadly 
are allowing the system to unravel due to a lenient or liberal approach to justice. Related to 
this argument, Belief in a Dangerous World might focus more on the existential threat posed 
to the individual as a result of an unstable system than being representative of a system threat 
perception itself. Although SJT predicts that such existential threats would activate system-
justifying behaviour, it may be that threats to the system, or even a combination of system 
and existential threats, result in a higher system justification tendency in right-wing 
adherents. 
On the other hand, the role of threat in the right-wing tendency to system-justify may 
be a process that occurs situationally and with respect to the threatening context, as opposed 
to chronic threat perception being the right-wing path to system justification. That is to say, 
specific and event-type threats to the system may activate a system-justifying behaviour or 
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increase a tendency to system justify. This was the first study to examine the role of 
dispositional threat perception and system-justifying tendencies with respect to right-wing 
ideology, and it may be that system justification only occurs in a threat context rather than 
manifesting as a stable tendency in response to a relatively stable threat perception tendency. 
This suggests that while threat did not explain the right-wing tendency to system-justify, it is 
possible that a specific type of threat may engage a specific type of system justifying 
behaviour. Contrary to expectations, both models performed similarly with respect to amount 
of variance explained in the system justification variables. However, model two predicted a 
larger amount of variance in the Belief in a Dangerous World mediator (28%) when 
compared to model one (10%). While this is expected given that variance explained would 
increase with the addition of an extra ideological variable, the use of RWA and SDO as 
ideological predictors in the single model allowed us to examine differential ideological 
effects that would not have been possible using a single-item orientation measure. Although 
both ideological variables were positively related to both system justification types, only 
RWA was positively related to the belief in a dangerous world mediator when RWA and 
SDO were allowed to correlate. Given the overall interest of this thesis in the role of threat in 
the relationship between right-wing ideology and climate change denial, understanding the 
differential relationships between ideology types and threat lend support to the continued use 
of the multidimensional ideological conceptualisation.  
Limitations 
Although this study adds to our understanding of the right-wing tendency to system-
justify in the novel socio-political context of Australia, it is also limited in its generalisability 
by its almost exclusive focus on Australian participants. In addition to this, as this is the first 
study to examine the ideology–threat–system justification relationships in an almost 
exclusively Australian sample, it is possible that contextual differences related to Australia’s 
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socio-political landscape mean that hypothesised relationships (largely based on work 
conducted with U.S. samples) between chronic threat perceptions and system-justification 
tendencies are not applicable. Nonetheless, the study adds to our understanding of system-
justification processes and their relationship to ideology in a context other than the U.S.  
An additional issue possibly arising from the type of recruitment used was the left-
wing skew of the sample. The means for both RWA and SDO were well below the mid-point 
for these scales and far more participants identified as left-wing than right wing. 
Unfortunately, this problem is not particularly uncommon, and even online samples using 
Amazon MTurk are known to lean left-wing ideologically (Levay, Freese, & Druckman, 
2016).  
Conclusions 
This study examined the theorised role of system threat in the right-wing tendency to system-
justify. The findings suggest that, at least at the chronic and individual difference level, one 
measure of dispositional system threat in Belief in a Dangerous World may not explain why 
right-wing adherents are more likely to have higher levels of system justification tendency 
than their left-wing counterparts. While this contradicts an SJT account of the role of threat in 
the ideology–system justification relationship, it is still possible that the process of justifying 
the system is a situational process that only occurs when individuals are confronted with a 
specific and direct threat to the system. As such, it is possible that Belief in a Dangerous 
World is a poor indicator of system threat, as it focuses on personal existential threat as a 
result of a system that is already perceived to be unstable, as opposed to a direct threat to the 
system itself.  Furthermore, this study only examined the role of the chronic tendency to 
perceive system threat, which means that it is difficult to conclude that threat, contextual or 
otherwise, is simply not a factor in the right-wing tendency to system justify. Therefore, 
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although Belief in a Dangerous World did not mediate the relationship between ideology and 
system justification tendencies, it is still possible that the specific threat of climate change 
mitigation will explain the relationship between ideology and climate change denial (a 
specific system-justifying behaviour). As such, the next chapter reports on a study that 
evaluates the system justification theory explanation for climate change denial by examining 
how climate change mitigation threat mediates the ideology–climate change denial 
relationship. 
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Chapter Seven: Study Four – Perceived Mitigation Threat Mediates Effects of Right-
Wing Ideology on Climate Change Beliefs. 
Abstract 
Climate change is a politically polarized issue, with conservatives more likely to deny its 
existence and its origins in human behaviour than liberals. While the link between ideology 
and climate change denial is well-established, less is known about what drives this 
relationship. This study evaluates a system justification theory explanation for this 
phenomenon by examining how climate change mitigation threat mediates the ideology–
climate change denial relationship. It extends understanding of this relationship by examining 
the differential effects of two types of right-wing ideology: Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
(RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). Participants (N = 334) were recruited via 
Amazon MTurk. Both SDO and the conventionalism facet of RWA were positively 
associated with all types of climate change denial. These relationships were both partially 
mediated by climate change mitigation threat. RWA aggression and submission facets were 
not significant predictors of the climate change denial outcomes in the path model. These 
findings provisionally support the argument that certain right-wing adherents will engage in 
climate change denial at least in part due to a perception that mitigation strategies to combat 
climate change will threaten the socioeconomic status quo.  
 
Note: This chapter was submitted as a manuscript to the Journal of Environmental 
Psychology, and is currently under review. A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted as 
a part of this study that was not included in the submitted manuscript but is included in the 
Results section of this chapter.   
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Introduction 
Scientific issues are increasingly polarised, such that political ideology is often a predictor of 
an individual’s position on issues where there is substantial scientific consensus 
(Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013). Climate change is a particularly polarised issue. 
Denial of climate change and climate science is more common among right-wing politicians 
(Fielding et al., 2012; Tranter & Booth, 2015), and right-wing adherents in general (Campbell 
& Kay, 2014; Guy, Kashima, Walker, & O'Neill, 2014; Heath & Gifford, 2006; Leviston et 
al., 2015; McCright & Dunlap, 2011b; McCright et al., 2016; Whitmarsh, 2011). A recent 
meta-analysis demonstrated that indicators of political orientation including party affiliation 
and types of political ideology are more predictive of climate change denial than other 
demographic variables such as education level, income, gender and age (Hornsey et al., 
2016). Although the relationships are well established, this study extends knowledge of why 
and how ideology relates to climate change beliefs by addressing two issues: the role of 
climate change mitigation threat and the conceptualisation of ideology. 
This study evaluates the System Justification Theory (SJT) explanation for climate 
change denial by examining whether climate change mitigation threat mediates the ideology–
climate change denial relationship. According to SJT, system justifying beliefs and 
behaviours are motivated by situational and dispositional factors (van der Toorn & Jost, 
2014) such as situational threats to the system (Ullrich & Cohrs, 2007; Wakslak et al., 2011), 
and heightened dispositional needs to reduce threat (Hennes et al., 2012). As a result, the 
theory predicts that perceived threats to the system increase the likelihood that people will 
engage in system-justifying behaviours as a way to reduce these threats (Kay & Friesen, 
2011). Importantly, it is expected that this will occur irrespective of whether or not these 
behaviours contradict individual or group interests (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). When applied to 
climate change, System Justification Theory suggests denial occurs in response to the 
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perception that climate change mitigation policies (such as carbon taxes and moving to a 
clean energy economy) pose a threat to the system (Feygina et al., 2010). Denying the 
problem removes the need for the threatening solution, and therefore actively supports the 
existing socioeconomic status quo. 
Past research points to the possibility that climate change denial is a system-justifying 
behaviour due to demonstrated relationships between system justification behaviours and 
tendencies and climate change denial (Feygina et al., 2010; Hennes et al., 2012), and threat 
and climate change denial (Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016). However, no study has examined 
whether right-wing adherents perceive mitigation to be a threat to the socioeconomic status 
quo, and accordingly whether this mediates the relationship between right-wing ideology and 
climate change denial. 
Ultimately, understanding this relationship may help to better frame climate change 
solutions to facilitate productive public debate. Furthermore, given the nature of political 
polarisation across several social, economic, and environmental issues, understanding the 
psychological underpinnings of the relationship between right-wing ideology and climate 
change denial may also provide insight into the effect of types of ideology on positions on 
other contentious political issues of an empirical nature.  
Motivated Denial - Climate Change Mitigation Threat 
Feygina, Jost, and Goldsmith (2010) argue that climate change denial may be partly 
motivated by a need to reduce threat to the socioeconomic system that climate change 
mitigation (referred to in this paper as ‘mitigation threat’) poses. This hypothesis is based on 
SJT, which suggests that some individuals, and right-wing adherents in particular (Jost et al., 
2008), are motivated to defend the status quo of a system when they perceive the system to be 
under threat, even in cases where their self-interest is undermined (Jost et al., 2004).  
78 
 
 
 
Experimental evidence supporting SJT suggests that system threats can shift beliefs 
and behaviours to become more supportive of the system (Kay et al., 2005; Ullrich & Cohrs, 
2007). For example, invoking the possibility of a terrorist attack on home soil was shown to 
increase the level of system justification (that is, the level of support for the existing social 
and political system in which one lives) in an experimental group when compared to a control 
(Ullrich & Cohrs, 2007). Criticism of one’s country can also invoke system-justifying 
behaviours such as increased endorsement of system-justifying stereotypes (e.g. that powerful 
people are intelligent; Kay et al., 2005). Furthermore, right-wing adherents are more likely to 
perceive threats (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Hibbing et al., 2014; Jost et al., 2003), and system 
threat in particular (Onraet et al., 2013). 
In the context of climate change denial, SJT predicts that right-wing adherents will 
deny climate change because they are motivated to reduce the threat to the socioeconomic 
system represented by climate change mitigation policies (e.g. carbon tax/cap and trade, 
reducing fossil fuel use). These policies necessarily require significant changes to the system 
that may be undesirable or threatening to individuals who are ideologically-aligned with the 
status quo. Supporting this contention, Feygina et al. (2010) found that the general tendency 
to system-justify, and the tendency to perceive the economic status quo as fair, partially 
mediated the relationship between political orientation and broad environmental concern. 
However, that study did not directly test the claim that threat itself mediates the relationship 
between right-wing ideology and the tendency to deny climate change, and given that their 
outcome variable was environmental denial and not climate change denial, conclusions with 
respect to system-justifying effects on the ideology–climate change denial relationship must 
be drawn with care. In one study that explored the role of a specific type of threat on the 
ideology–climate change denial relationship, Hoffarth and Hodson (2016) discovered that 
environmentalist threat mediated the relationship between ideological variables (i.e. RWA 
79 
 
 
 
and SDO) and climate denial, which lends support to the threat reduction argument. This 
study extends upon these findings by examining the effect of a broader system threat on the 
ideology–climate change denial relationship, such as climate change mitigation threat, as 
opposed to the perceived threat of a specific social group.  
Differential Ideological Predictors of Climate Change Denial 
A limitation of much of the past research on the ideology–climate change denial 
relationship is in how political ideology has been conceptualised and measured. Typically, 
single-item self-placement measures where individuals place themselves on a bipolar scale 
that has liberal and conservative endpoints are used as a proxy of an individual’s ideology. 
This is problematic given extensive research indicating the existence of at least two distinct 
strands of political ideology (Feldman & Johnston, 2013; Jost et al., 2003). These ideological 
dimensions are sometimes labelled ‘resistance to change’ and ‘acceptance of equality’ (Jost et 
al., 2003) or ‘social’ and ‘economic’ ideology (Feldman & Johnston, 2013). These 
dimensions are commonly operationalised as the psychological constructs Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism (RWA; which represents the dimension of resistance to change/social 
ideology) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; which represents the dimension of 
acceptance of equality/economic ideology). High levels of RWA indicate high submission to 
authority, a commitment to norms and conventions of society, and a preference for authority 
to punish deviants and norm violators (Altemeyer, 1998; Funke, 2005), whereas high levels 
of SDO indicate a preference for intergroup hierarchy and group dominance (Ho et al., 2015; 
Pratto et al., 1994). The Dual Process Model suggests that while high RWA and high SDO 
will sometimes predict support for the same sets of government policies, the mechanisms 
underlying these outcomes will differ (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). As such, adopting an 
approach that incorporates both ideological dimensions allows assessment of potential 
differential effects of these political ideologies on climate change denial. 
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Indeed, studies have found that RWA and SDO are significant ideological predictors of 
climate change denial (Häkkinen & Akrami, 2014; Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016; Milfont et al., 
2013; Stanley et al., 2017), and despite being correlated, often predict denial independent of 
one another. Although SDO was the only significant predictor of climate change denial out of 
the two ideological variables in one study (Häkkinen & Akrami, 2014), both SDO and RWA 
have been shown to independently explain variance in climate change denial (Milfont et al., 
2013). RWA and SDO were also independent predictors of denial through an 
environmentalist threat mediator (that is, perceived threat to society, tradition, and the 
economy posed by environmentalists; Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016). In sum, the findings 
regarding the contributions of RWA and SDO could suggest the possibility of different right-
wing ideological pathways to climate change denial, highlighting the merit in the continued 
examination of the effects of the two ideological paths of the multidimensional model on 
climate change denial. 
The Present Research 
Given the relationship between right-wing ideologies and perception of system threat, 
climate change denial may in fact be a threat-reduction strategy appealing to right-wing 
adherents (Feygina et al., 2010). However, it is not known whether different types of right-
wing adherents (RWA and SDO) will react to that type of mitigation threat differently. 
Utilising a multidimensional model of ideology allows examination of this. Finally, 
investigating the explanatory value of system-level threat in the context of a polarised issue 
such as climate change may have implications for other political issues. 
The aim of this study is two-fold. First, to extend understanding of the relationship 
between political ideology and climate change denial by examining the mediating role of 
climate change mitigation threat. Second, to examine whether there are differential 
81 
 
 
 
associations between the two types (RWA, SDO) of ideology and climate change denial 
outcomes. 
Consistent with past research demonstrating a positive relationship between right-
wing ideology and climate change denial (Häkkinen & Akrami, 2014; Hoffarth & Hodson, 
2016; McCright & Dunlap, 2011a; Milfont et al., 2013), we predicted that ideological types 
in both the unidimensional (Ideological orientation) and multidimensional models (RWA and 
SDO) would be positively associated with climate change denial (hypothesis one). 
Furthermore, consistent with SJT (Feygina et al., 2010; Kay & Friesen, 2011), it was 
predicted that climate change mitigation threat would be positively related to climate change 
denial (hypothesis two). Finally, consistent with Feygina et al.’s (2010) system justification 
argument that right-wing adherents are more likely to engage in motivated denial of climate 
change to maintain the threatened socioeconomic status quo, it was predicted that climate 
change mitigation threat would: (a) mediate the positive relationship between ideological 
orientation and climate change denial in the unidimensional model (hypothesis three); and (b) 
mediate the relationship between the ideological dimensions RWA and SDO and climate 
change denial in the multidimensional model (hypothesis four).  
Additionally, given that RWA and SDO could differentially predict climate change 
denial outcomes, as well as be differentially mediated by climate change mitigation threat, we 
compared the multidimensional model of ideology with the unidimensional measurement 
model to determine whether it: (i) explained greater variance in climate change denial; and 
(ii) whether the two dimensions of ideology differentially associated with threat and climate 
change denial.  
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Materials and Methods 
Participants 
A sample of 334 U.S. participants (137 female; Mage = 34.7, SD = 5.98, range = 19-
70) were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk. As appears to be typical with MTurk 
samples (Levay et al., 2016), our sample leaned liberal ideologically, with 59.9% identifying 
as liberal or liberal-leaning, 21.6% identifying as conservative or conservative-leaning, and 
18.5% scored at the mid-point of the single-item self-report scale.  
Materials 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA): Funke’s (2005) multifactorial 12-item RWA scale is a 
shorter version of the original RWA scale, which designates four items to each of the three 
facets, measured on a 7-point Likert scale: Authoritarian aggression (Aggression; α = .72), 
authoritarian submission (Submission; α = .77), and conventionalism (Conventionalism; α = 
.84).  
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; α = .89): This 8-item short form of the SDO7 scale 
developed by Ho et al. (2015) measures the tendency to prefer group-based hierarchy and 
inequality, on a 7-point Likert scale. 
Ideological orientation: single-item 11-point self-placement measure assessing an 
individual’s ideological orientation on a scale ranging from 0 (extremely liberal) to 10 
(extremely conservative). This type of orientation measure is commonly used in climate 
change belief research (e.g. McCright & Dunlap, 2011a). 
Climate Change Mitigation Threat (CCMT; α = .96): The 12-item CCMT Scale (see 
Appendix D.4 for scale items) was developed for this study and measures the perceived threat 
of climate change mitigation efforts (e.g. carbon pricing, caps on emissions, moving away 
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from fossil fuel use) on the stability of the social and economic status quo, on a 7-point Likert 
scale. Higher scores on this scale indicate greater levels of perceived socioeconomic threat 
caused by climate change mitigation policies. 
Climate Change Denial: The 16-item climate change denial scale (see Appendix D.4 for scale 
items) is a multifactorial scale based on a previous climate change denial scale created by 
Häkkinen and Akrami (2014). As discussed in Chapter Four, the original scale was modified 
for this study based on the findings of studies one and two of this thesis. The scale measures 
four types of climate change denial (denial of existence of climate change (α = .85), denial of 
human cause (α = .93), impact denial (α = .93), and climate science denial (α = .91)), on a 7-
point Likert scale. Higher scores on each factor indicate higher levels of the specific type of 
climate change denial.  
Analytic strategy 
All analyses were conducted using SPSS and AMOS 23. All descriptive statistics and 
zero-order correlational analyses were conducted in SPSS, while path analyses were tested in 
AMOS. Multiple imputation was conducted to replace missing values in the dataset. Twenty-
nine participants had missing data on at least one scale item, and less than 1% of the overall 
data was missing. Prior to hypothesis testing, confirmatory factor analyses were conducted on 
all scales used in the analyses. Hypotheses 1 to 4 were tested via two mediation models using 
maximum likelihood estimation. The two models were identical except that the first model 
utilised the single-item self-placement measure of political ideology (unidimensional model) 
and the second model measured ideology by the constructs RWA and SDO 
(multidimensional model; see Figure 1). Bootstrapping was used to test the significance of 
the indirect paths.  
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Figure 1. Hypothesised mitigation threat mediation of ideology variables (ideological 
orientation in the unidimensional model, and RWA and SDO in the multidimensional model) 
and climate change denial types (existence, human cause, impact, and climate science). 
 
To examine the relative effects of a single versus multidimensional approach to 
ideology on types of climate change denial, we compared the unidimensional and 
multidimensional models for (i) variance explained and (ii) differential effects of ideology. 
For the multidimensional model, the three RWA factors (Submission, Aggression and 
Conventionalism) and SDO were tested simultaneously as independent variables, with 
Climate Change Mitigation Threat as the sole mediator. Existence denial, human cause 
denial, impact denial, and climate science denial were all tested simultaneously as outcome 
variables, and were all allowed to intercorrelate. The multidimensional ideological model 
also allowed us to examine the differential effects of our ideology measures (RWA and SDO) 
on our outcome variables. 
Ideology variables 
•  
Climate Change 
Denial Types 
 
Climate Change 
Mitigation Threat 
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Results 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Variables Used in Path Analyses 
Confirmatory factor analyses (CFA), using maximum likelihood estimation method 
and run with AMOS version 23 (2015), were conducted on the scales used in this study to 
establish construct validity. The fit of each model was assessed using the chi-square (χ2) 
statistic, the Comparative Fix Index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI), the Standardised 
Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA). According to recommendations by Hu and Bentler (1999) good model fit is 
suggested when the CFI and TLI are each greater than .90, the SRMR is less than .08, and the 
RMSEA is less than .06. Fit statistics for all variables are listed in Table 11. 
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Table 11 Fit Indices for Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Scales 
Latent Variables χ2(df) CFI TLI SRMR RMSEA 
RWA (one factor) 1836.122 (270)* .854 .822 .066 .059 
RWA (three factors) 1122.231 (250)* .919 .893 .058 .046 
SDO (one factor) 43.302 (19)* .984 .976 .027 .062 
SDO (two factors) 37.734 (19)* .988 .982 .026 .054 
SDO (bifactor model) 16.288 (12) .997 .993 .018 .033 
CCMT 1169.451 (265)* .952 .941 .030 .045 
CCD (one factor) 3687.270 (520)* .889 .872 .045 .060 
CCD (four factors) 1639.100 (500)* .960 .952 .034 .037 
Note. RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; CCMT = 
Climate Change Mitigation Threat; CCD = Climate Change Denial; χ2 = chi-square; df = 
degrees of freedom for χ2; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; SRMR 
= Standardised Root Mean Square of the Residual; RMSEA = Room Mean Square Error of 
Approximation. 
*p<.05 
 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism. The 12-item Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (Funke, 
2005) is designed as a multifaceted scale that separates the RWA facets of Conventionalism, 
Submission, and Aggression. However, given possible issues of multicollinearity when these 
related factors are used in path analyses it was decided to first compare the model fit of a one 
factor model with a three factor model. Fit indices listed in Table 11 suggest that the one 
factor model is a poor fit to the data despite the SRMR and RMESA being below acceptable 
cut-offs. The three-factor solution was a better fit to the data (despite the TLI being just 
below the .9 cut-off). Furthermore, correlations between the factors (see Table 12) suggested 
that they are distinct although highly related factors. Multicollinearity diagnostic tests yielded 
figures for VIF and tolerance well below the widely suggested cut-offs of less than 10 for 
VIF and less than .2 for tolerance (O’brien, 2007), therefore the decision was made to adopt 
the three-factor RWA model.  
Social Dominance Orientation. The 8-item Social Dominance Orientation Scale is also 
designed as a multifaceted scale, comprising a dominance and an antiegalitarian factor. 
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However, the authors suggest that its use as a multifaceted scale depends on the objective of 
the research. As such, CFAs were conducted for both single factor and two factor solutions. 
Although similar, the two factor solution demonstrated slightly better model fit with the 
RMSEA less than .06. However, this model also showed that the two factors were highly 
correlated (r=.91). In light of this high correlation, a bifactor model was evaluated with a 
general factor in addition to subfactors accounting for the residual covariance in item sets 
corresponding to dominance and antiegalitarianism. This structure had strong fit and given 
the stronger loading of items on the general factor in general justifies the focus on this model 
of SDO in secondary analyses (Reise, Moore, & Haviland, 2010).  
Climate Change Mitigation Threat. The 10-item Climate Change Mitigation Threat scale is 
a unifactorial scale designed for this study. Fit indices listed in Table 11 indicate that this 
scale is a good fit to the data. 
Climate Change Denial. The 16-item Climate Change Denial scale is a modified scale based 
on an existing scale used in a prior study (Häkkinen & Akrami, 2014). In this study the scale 
was used to measure a single climate change denial factor. However, the scale items refer to 
four distinct types of climate change denial. Therefore we conducted separate CFAs for a 
single factor and a four factor model, with the four factor model demonstrating good model 
fit and the one factor model fitting poorly.  
Bivariate Correlations 
Ideological orientation, RWA (all factors) and SDO were positively associated with 
greater levels of climate change denial (See Table 12). Consistent with hypothesis one, all 
ideological variables were positively related to climate change mitigation threat, which was 
itself positively related to all climate change denial variables (hypothesis two). 
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Table 12 Bivariate correlations and descriptive statistics for all variables. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Range M SD 
1. Ideological Orientation          0-10 4.77 2.55 
2. Conventionalism .64         1-7 3.02 1.53 
3. Aggression .51 .67        1-7 3.55 1.35 
4. Submission .58 .80 .73       1-7 3.09 1.21 
5. Social Dominance 
Orientation 
.50 .45 .49 .44      1-7 2.56 1.22 
6. CC Mitigation Threat .46 .44 .33 .41 .38     1-7 3.18 1.36 
7. Existence Denial .48 .49 .31 .39 .45 .58    1-7 2.43 1.29 
8. Human Cause Denial .45 .43 .29 .34 .41 .61 .79   1-7 2.81 1.50 
9. Impact Denial .48 .48 .30 .38 .44 .63 .81 .87  1-7 2.49 1.45 
10. Climate Science Denial .52 .52 .39 .43 .39 .62 .81 .79 .81 1-7 2.63 1.51 
Note. All correlations were significant at p<.001
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Climate Change Mitigation Threat Mediation 
Total, direct, and indirect effects for ideology variables on all outcome variables for 
the unidimensional and multidimensional models are shown in Table 13 (for a graphical 
representation of these results see Appendix C.2). Hypothesis three was partially supported. 
The positive relationship between the ideological orientation item and all climate change 
denial outcomes was partially mediated by climate change mitigation threat in the 
unidimensional model. Hypothesis four was also partially supported. Climate Change 
Mitigation Threat partially mediated all paths from Conventionalism and SDO, and all 
climate change denial variables in both models. Significant indirect effects were found 
between both Conventionalism and SDO and the outcome variables, although the direct 
effects remained relatively large as a proportion of total effect. Although the total effects on 
the outcomes were similar for Conventionalism and SDO, Conventionalism (β = .45 p<.05, 
95% CI [.29, .62]) had a larger estimated total effect on Climate Science Denial than SDO (β 
= .20, p<.05, 95% CI [.08, .32]).  
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Table 13 Standardised effects decomposition for Models One and Two, predicting outcome measures 
 ED  95% CI HCD  95% CI ID  95% CI CSD  95% CI CCMT 
(mediator) 
95% CI 
Unidimensional Model R2=.39  R2=.41  R2=.44  R2=.46  R2=.21  
Lib-Con           
Total effect .48*(.05) [.38, .56] .45* (.05) [.35, .53] .48* (.05) [.38, .56] .52* (.04) [.43, .59] .45*(.05) [.35, .54] 
Direct effect .27*(.05) [.16, .37] .21* (.05) [.12, .31] .24* (.05) [.14, .34] .29* (.05) [.20, .38]   
Indirect effect .21*(.03) [.15, .28] .23* (.04) [.17, .31] .24* (.04) [.17, .31] .22* (.03) [.17, .29]   
CCMT (mediator)           
Total effect .46*(.06) [.35, .56] .51* (.05) [.40, .61] .52* (.06) [.40, .62] .49* (.06) [.38, .60]   
Multidimensional Model R2=.45  R2=.44  R2=.48  R2=.47  R2=.24  
Conventionalism           
Total effect .45*(.08) [.30, .59] .39*(.09) [.21, .57] .44*(.09) [.27, .61] .45*(.09) [.29, .62] .29*(.10) [.09, .47] 
Direct effect .33*(.07) [.20, .46] .25*(.08) [.11, .42] .30*(.07) [.17, .46] .31*(.08) [.17, .46]   
Indirect effect .12*(.04) [.03, .21] .14*(.05) [.05, .25] .14*(.05) [.05, .25] .14*(.05) [.05, .25]   
Aggression           
Total effect .16*(.07) [-.30,-.02] -.10 (.07) [-.23, .05] -.14 (.07) [-.28, .01] .01 (.07) [-.14, .15] -.08 (.08) [-.22, .07] 
Direct effect -.13 (.06) [-.24, .00] -.06 (.06) [-.18, .07] -.10 (.06) [-.23, .02] .05 (.06) [-.07, .17]   
Indirect effect -.03 (.03) [-.10, .03] -.04 (.04) [-.12, .03] -.04 (.04) [-.11, .03] -.04 (.04) [-.11, .03]   
Submission           
Total effect .00 (.09) [-.17, .16] -.04 (.09) [-.22, .15] -.02 (.09) [-.19, .15] -.03 (.09) [-.20, .15] .14 (.09) [-.04, .32] 
Direct effect -.06 (.09) [-.20, .09] -.11 (.08) [-.27, .05] -.09 (.07) [-.23, .05] -.10 (.08) [-.25, .05]   
Indirect effect .06 (.04) [-.01, .13] .07 (.05) [-.02, .16] .07 (.05) [-.02, .16] .06 (.04) [-.02, .16]   
SDO           
Total effect .33*(.06) [.22, .44] .32*(.06) [.20, .42] .33*(.06) [.21, .44] .20*(.06) [.08, .32] .23*(.07) [.10, .36] 
Direct effect .24*(.06) [.13, .35] .20*(.06) [.09, .32] .22*(.06) [.11, .34] .09 (.06) [-.02,.21]   
Indirect effect .09*(.03) [.04, .16] .11*(.04) [.05, .19] .11*(.03) [.05, .18] .11*(.03) [.05, .19]   
CCMT (mediator)           
Total effect .41*(.06) [.30, .51] .48*(.06) [.36, .60] .48*(.06) [.36, .58] .47*(.06) [.35, .59]   
ED = Existence Denial; HCD = Human Cause Denial; ID = Impact Denial; CSD = Climate Science Denial; CCMT = Climate Change Mitigation 
Threat; Lib-Con = Ideological Orientation. 
*p<.05 Standard errors in parentheses.
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Comparison of Ideological Models 
Variance explained in the four outcome variables was similar across both models, 
ranging from 39% to 46% in the unidimensional ideological model, and 43% to 47% in the 
multidimensional ideological model, as shown in Table 14. Similarly, there was only a slight 
difference between variance explained in the mediator (climate change mitigation threat) 
across both models.  
Table 14 Percent variance explained in outcome variables (and mediator) by predictor 
variables for the unidimensional model and the multidimensional model. 
Outcome variable Unidimensional Model Multidimensional Model 
Existence Denial 39% 45% 
Human Cause Denial 41% 44% 
Impact Denial 44% 48% 
Climate Science Denial 46% 47% 
CC Mitigation Threat (mediator) 21% 24% 
 
The multidimensional model allows us to compare differential ideological effects on 
climate change denial variables (see Table 13 for effects decomposition). Conventionalism 
and SDO had significant total effects on all climate change denial outcomes. Aggression and 
Submission had much smaller, and in almost all cases, nonsignificant effects on all climate 
change denial outcomes.  
Discussion 
The overall aim of this study was to extend understanding of the relationship between 
political ideology and types of climate change denial by examining the explanatory role of 
climate change mitigation threat on the ideology–climate change denial relationship. The use 
of a multidimensional ideological approach also enabled us to better characterise the nature 
of the ideology–climate change denial relationship.  
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As predicted, and consistent with past research (e.g. Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016), 
ideological orientation, SDO, and the three RWA factors significantly and positively related 
to all four types of climate change denial (hypothesis one). The predicted positive 
relationship between climate change mitigation threat and our types of climate change denial 
was also supported (hypothesis two), suggesting that those who perceive attempts to mitigate 
climate change as threatening to the socioeconomic system are also likely to engage in denial. 
Additionally, the hypotheses (three and four) that climate change mitigation threat would 
mediate the relationship between the ideological variables and the four types of climate 
change denial in the respective models were partially supported. Climate change mitigation 
threat partially mediated the relationship between the self-placement ideology measure and 
types of climate change denial in the unidimensional model (hypothesis three), and 
Conventionalism and SDO on four types of climate change denial in the multidimensional 
model (hypothesis four).  
These findings lend partial support to SJT explanation of climate change denial, that 
right-wing adherents may be denying climate change, in part, due to the perception that 
mitigation policies such as carbon taxes and moving away from fossil fuels could destabilise 
the economy and the socioeconomic status quo (Feygina et al., 2010). However, given that 
ideological orientation in the unidimensional model, and both conventionalism and SDO in 
the multidimensional model still significantly contributed to the variance explained in climate 
change denial types via the direct paths, this suggests that mechanisms beyond mitigation 
threat contribute to this relationship. For instance, given that the direct path between 
ideological orientation and climate change denial types remained significant in the 
unidimensional ideological model, it is possible that part of the process of conservative 
identification leads individuals to adopt typical conservative issue positions, such as denial of 
climate change (McCright & Dunlap, 2011a). Nonetheless, given that climate change 
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mitigation threat was a measure of the level of perception that solutions such as carbon taxes 
would destabilise the socioeconomic status quo, there is merit in the argument that mitigation 
threat is at least one of several possible mechanisms that explain the right-wing tendency to 
deny climate change. This finding builds on past work on the system-justifying bases of 
climate change denial, which had previously demonstrated that the tendency to justify the 
status quo partially explained right-wing denial of climate change (Feygina et al., 2010), by 
allowing us to point to a possible mechanism. Specifically, for right-wing adherents, the 
perceived threat of climate change mitigation may trigger a threat-reduction or system-
justifying response: climate change denial.  
With respect to the relative performance of the unidimensional versus 
multidimensional ideological approaches, both models performed similarly in terms of the 
amount of variance explained in the dependent variables. The path model utilising the 
multidimensional approach (model two) explained between 1 to 5% more variance in the 
climate change denial outcomes than the model using the single item ideological measure 
(model one). Based on this finding it would be tempting to conclude that a single item 
ideology measure is adequate to use when investigating the ideology-climate change denial 
relationship. However, the multidimensional model demonstrated some important differences 
between the effects of our two ideological dimensions that would not be elucidated using a 
single-item self-placement measure. SDO and the conventionalism dimension of RWA (but 
not Aggression and Submission) remained significant independent predictors of all outcome 
variables, lending some support to past findings suggesting that right-wing denial of climate 
change may occur independently through both RWA and SDO (Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016). 
Additionally, as we could compare the three RWA factors using the multifactorial measure of 
RWA, we discovered that the total effects of the RWA dimensions Aggression and 
Submission were comparatively small and in almost every case statistically nonsignificant. 
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This suggests that the aggression and submission aspects of RWA may be less relevant when 
examining the effects of RWA on climate change denial, and it is the aspect of RWA 
concerned with adherence to tradition and social norms that is of most importance.  
Although the amount of variance explained in our four climate change denial outcome 
variables was relatively similar, the multidimensional model demonstrated differential effects 
of Conventionalism and SDO on Climate Science Denial, such that that Conventionalism (β 
= .45, 95% CI [.29, .62]) was a stronger predictor of climate science denial (SD) than SDO (β 
= .20, p<.05, 95% CI [.08, .32]) This may suggest that conventionalists are more likely to 
hold more scepticism of climate evidence and therefore may have lower levels of trust in 
climate science and scientists than those high in SDO. There is no evidence to our knowledge 
that has adopted the Dual-Process Model of ideology to examine relationships between 
ideology and climate science denial specifically and independently of other types of climate 
change denial, therefore this finding is novel and furthers our understanding of the nuanced 
nature of the relationship between ideology and beliefs about climate science in particular. 
The multidimensional model of ideology uncovers the complexity of the ideology-
climate change denial relationship by way of illustrating the different ideological paths to 
denial, through climate change mitigation threat. Conventionalists’ preference for social order 
and the maintenance of existing social practices and norms could lead them to perceive 
mitigation strategies as threatening to the social and economic world that they are most 
familiar with. On the other hand, those high in SDO who also engage in climate change 
denial may not take issue with general changes to the socioeconomic system as such, 
however they may find it difficult to accept those changes that threaten a system with existing 
economic and hierarchical inequalities. Mitigation solutions such as carbon taxes and 
restriction on the free-market could be perceived as threatening a preferred economic 
ideological standpoint, that hierarchy, group dominance and inequality are natural by-
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products of society, and government intervention is not warranted even in the case of 
environmental issues (Campbell & Kay, 2014). Understanding the different ideological paths 
to climate change denial and the underlying ideological reasons for perceived mitigation 
threat could assist us in tailoring fact-based messaging regarding both climate risks and the 
consequences of mitigation (or doing nothing about climate change), to different segments of 
the community. Finally, such effects could be replicated in other polarised policy areas where 
system threat may be a factor. In particular, issues involving acceptance of scientific evidence 
may be specifically amenable to the multidimensional approach, given the finding in this 
study that the effect of Conventionalism on climate science denial was stronger than for 
SDO.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Given threat salience was not manipulated in this study, the findings do not 
demonstrate that climate change mitigation threat causes right-wing adherents to deny 
climate change. Nonetheless, these findings represent a step forward in our understanding of 
the possible psychological underpinnings of the relationship between right-wing ideologies 
and climate change denial in contexts where the issue is politically polarised. Future research 
should examine the effects of climate change mitigation messaging and information on the 
propensity to be concerned about the impact of climate change. Furthermore, as this study 
focuses on a single science issue that is viewed by the political right as controversial or 
debatable, our study did not address the possibility of left-wing threat perception related to 
other science issues where the common left-wing position is at odds with the scientific 
consensus. That is to say, our findings do not resolve the broader discussion regarding the 
cause of science denial being a function of a right-wing tendency to be sceptical of science 
versus perceptions of aspects of particular science-based issues being influenced by 
ideologically-motivated reasoning, across the political spectrum. Finally, due to the use of 
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Amazon MTurk as a method of recruitment, our study only sampled US residents, which 
limits our ability to generalise across other Western nations where social and political 
conditions, and therefore the resulting correlates of climate change denial, may be different. 
Conclusions 
Our study examined a hypothesised but not previously tested explanation for climate change 
polarisation that right-wing adherents are more likely than their left-wing counterparts to 
engage in types of climate change denial due to the perceived system threat posed by climate 
change mitigation. These findings suggest that popular solutions for climate change, such as 
carbon taxes and reducing fossil fuel reliance, may provide concern for right-wing adherents 
who either view these solutions as system destabilising, or are ideologically opposed to 
stronger government influence in the economy. Understanding the underlying factors 
involved in right-wing denial of climate change should work to enable more nuanced and 
considered policy debate when discussing solutions for mitigating climate change as well as 
reducing the catastrophic effects of extreme weather events linked to the phenomenon. 
Additionally, policy framing may benefit from the understanding that some mitigation 
strategies may at least lack surface appeal to various groups and individuals in the 
community. Finally, this study has adopted an approach to ideology that may help to shed 
light on correlates and causes of other polarised policy issues where different types or liberals 
and conservatives have differences of opinion. Future research could examine issues where 
low science acceptance exists among left-wing adherents, such as nuclear energy generation 
(Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & Braman, 2011), with a dual-process ideology and threat 
framework, to better understand the generality of these science denial motivations.  
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Chapter Eight: General Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
Introduction 
Within the program of research outlined in this thesis I applied a System Justification Theory 
approach to understand the right-wing tendency to deny climate change. I achieved this by 
examining the mediating effect of climate change mitigation threat on the right-wing 
ideology-climate change denial relationship, as well as adopting the Dual Process Model 
(DPM) of Ideology. To do this, I explored community understanding of climate change 
(Study One, Chapter Three) to assist in the construction of a comprehensive measure of 
climate change denial.  Next, I conducted a pilot study (Study Two, Chapter Four) that tested 
an existing climate change scale which addressed conceptual and measurement issues 
highlighted by the findings from Study One. The next step was to test the System 
Justification Theory claim that higher perceived system threat leads individuals, and right-
wing adherents in particular, to engage in system justification in a general context (Study 
Three, Chapter Six). I utilised the DPM to explore the differential effects of RWA and SDO 
on system justification tendencies. Studies One, Two and Three all informed the design of the 
final study (Study Four, Chapter Seven) which examined the mediating effect of climate 
change mitigation threat on the relationship between our multidimensional model of ideology 
(RWA and SDO) and climate change denial.  
Summary of Empirical Findings 
The aim of this thesis was to examine the role of climate change mitigation threat in the right-
wing tendency to deny climate change. Therefore, I sought to answer four research questions 
across four empirical studies. These questions were:  
1. What are community salient beliefs about climate change, cause, impact, and scientific 
evidence? (answered in Study One) 
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2. Would an existing climate change denial questionnaire, which dealt with concerns raised 
in the findings of Study One, demonstrate adequate reliability and item variance so as to 
be used as a measure of the climate change denial outcome variable in Study Four? 
(answered in Study Two). 
3. Does Belief in a Dangerous World, a system threat variable, mediate the relationship 
between right-wing ideology and system justification tendencies? (answered in Study 
Three) 
4. Does Climate Change Mitigation Threat mediate the relationship between right-wing 
ideology and Climate Change Denial types? (answered in Study Four) 
The following subsections present summaries of each study and how these findings addressed 
each research question. 
Study One: Community Understanding of Climate Change and Denial 
Study One was an elicitation study that was conducted to assist in the construction or 
adoption of items for climate change denial scales, to be used in the final thesis study. This 
was done to address a lack of formative work in the literature examining community 
understanding of and beliefs about climate change with the aim to use such data to assist in 
scale construction.  
Findings from this elicitation work lead to three important considerations for the development 
of a climate change denial scale. These were:  
• Use the term “climate change” instead of “global warming” in item construction 
- given that some participants saw global warming as a component of climate change, 
and a less accurate descriptor of the phenomenon, the term “climate change” appears 
more suitable to use. 
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• Avoid Knowledge-Based Items - Although participants could identify that fossil fuel 
use and carbon emissions are a major factor in the cause of climate change, few 
participants explicitly identified the mechanisms that connect the two. 
• Create Climate Change Denial Sub-factors - Not all participants believed that 
humans contribute to the phenomenon of rising temperatures, while some believed 
that climate change is a term that implies a phenomenon caused by humans. 
Furthermore, there were mixed reactions with respect to the impacts of climate 
change and perceived risk. This would appear to suggest that only asking about the 
existence of climate change is likely to result in misleading outcomes that are difficult 
to meaningfully interpret. Therefore, a multifactorial measure of climate change 
denial was sought out.  
Study Two: Climate Change Denial Questionnaire Development and Pilot 
Testing 
The aim of the pilot study was to examine scale reliability and item variance of a 
climate change denial scale published after the completion of Study One (Häkkinen & 
Akrami, 2014). This scale appeared to address issues raised in the Study One findings. The 
findings from the pilot study supported the continued use of the Climate Change Denial scale 
as a multifactorial measure of existence denial, human cause denial, impact denial, and 
science denial. As such, items 10, 13, and 15 were omitted, and the wording of item 14 was 
changed to omit mention of “degrees” alluding to temperature change so as to adhere to 
earlier concerns regarding knowledge of climate change. As a result of the work conducted in 
Studies One and Two, a reliable and balanced climate change denial scale was created to be 
used in Study Four. 
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Study Three: The Role of System Threat in the Right-Wing Tendency to System-
Justify 
Study Three aimed to examine the mediating effect of a system threat variable (Belief 
in a Dangerous World) on the relationship between right-wing ideology and two types of 
system justification tendency (economic and general). Additionally, by adopting the Dual 
Process Model conceptualisation of ideology and comparing a model using self-placement 
ideological orientation (unidimensional model) with two ideological dimensions in RWA and 
SDO (multidimensional model), the study was able to examine whether there are differential 
ideological effects on system justification outcomes, to gather a more nuanced understanding 
of the different ideological underpinnings of the tendency to justify and maintain the status 
quo. 
Although conservative ideological orientation, RWA and SDO all positively related to 
Belief in a Dangerous World and system-justification tendency outcomes, supporting past 
studies examining the relationships between these variables (Hennes et al., 2012; Onraet et 
al., 2013), the path analysis did not reveal a mediation effect for Belief in a Dangerous World 
on any ideology-system justification relationships. 
With respect to the comparison of unidimensional and multidimensional ideological 
models, variance explained in general system justification was similar across both models, 
however the multidimensional model explained more variance in economic system 
justification. The multidimensional model allowed us to compare differential ideological 
effects on system justification variables. SDO had significant total effects on both system 
justification outcomes, however RWA had significant total effects on economic but not 
general system justification.  
101 
 
 
 
The findings therefore suggest that, at least at the chronic and individual difference 
level, one measure of dispositional system threat in Belief in a Dangerous World may not 
explain why right-wing adherents are more likely to have higher levels of system justification 
tendency than their left-wing counterparts. Therefore, this finding does not support a System 
Justification Theory account for the relationship between right-wing ideology and system 
justification, which suggests that perceived threats to the system results in individuals, and 
right-wing adherents in particular, to increase their support for the threatened status quo 
(Hennes et al., 2012).  
Study Four: Perceived Mitigation Threat Mediates Effects of Right-Wing 
Ideology on Climate Change Beliefs. 
The aim of Study Four was to extend understanding of the relationship between 
political ideology and climate change denial by testing the mediating role of climate change 
mitigation threat. Additionally, this study compared the relative variance explained in a path 
model containing a unidimensional conceptualisation of ideology and one containing a 
multidimensional conceptualisation. The study also aimed to examine whether there are 
differential associations between the two types (RWA, SDO) of ideology and climate change 
denial outcomes (in the second path model). 
Consistent with past research (Häkkinen & Akrami, 2014; Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016; 
Milfont et al., 2013), ideological orientation, RWA (all factors) and SDO were positively 
associated with greater levels of climate change denial. Additionally, all ideological variables 
were positively related to the climate change mitigation threat mediator, which was itself 
positively related to all climate change denial variables. Importantly, climate change 
mitigation threat partially mediated the relationships between ideology variables (self-
reported ideological orientation, RWA, and SDO) and climate change denial types (existence, 
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human cause, impact, and science) in both models. This lends provisional support to the 
System Justification Theory account of climate change denial, that threats to the 
socioeconomic system from climate change mitigation in part drives climate change denial 
among right-wing adherents (Feygina et al., 2010). However, while the findings may indicate 
that climate change denial is, in part, a defensive reaction to a threat to the current 
socioeconomic status quo, it is possible that this finding is representative of other processes. 
Another possible explanation for the partial mediating effect of mitigation threat is Solution 
Aversion (Campbell & Kay, 2014). This approach suggests that because the solutions 
involved in climate change mitigation often involve increased government regulation, such as 
carbon pricing and limits to pollution, right-wing adherents and those who endorse free-
market ideology are already averse to these mitigation strategies. Therefore, and irrespective 
of any threat to the system that these solutions may pose, they deny climate change and the 
need for those solutions (Campbell & Kay, 2014). Other theoretical approaches such as 
ideologically-motivated reasoning and cultural cognition argue that the way we process 
information in science domains (such as climate change) is affected by our prior cultural and 
ideological beliefs (Kahan et al., 2011; Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2016). In short, we reject 
scientific findings that threaten our worldview. Here, the mechanism for worldview threat 
would seem to lie with how much climate change mitigation is perceived to be counter to a 
person’s ideological beliefs. Therefore, while these accounts of right-wing denial are similar 
in nature, our findings could be interpreted as support for either or all approaches, and as such 
interpreting the results from the mediation model should be done with caution. 
With respect to the path model comparisons comparing the unidimensional and 
multidimensional ideological models, variance explained in the four climate change denial 
outcome variables was similar across both. Similarly, there was only a slight difference 
between variance explained in the mediator (climate change mitigation threat) across both 
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models. However, the multidimensional model allowed us to compare differential ideological 
effects on climate change denial variables, and found that the Conventionalism aspect of 
RWA, and SDO, had significant total effects on all climate change denial outcomes. 
Aggression and Submission sub-factors of RWA had much smaller, and in almost all cases, 
nonsignificant effects on all climate change denial outcomes.  
Theoretical Implications for Political Ideology Research 
Although the multidimensional ideological models in Studies Three and Four did not explain 
much more variance in the outcomes than the unidimensional model, they illustrated some 
important differences between the effects of our two ideological dimensions that would not 
be elucidated using a single-item self-placement measure. With respect to Study Three only 
RWA was positively related to the belief in a dangerous world mediator when RWA and 
SDO were allowed to correlate, suggesting that RWA but not SDO might be the right-wing 
ideological link to chronic system threat perceptions. Furthermore, direct effects for SDO on 
system justification outcomes were larger than for RWA. With respect to research examining 
the ideological predictors of system-justifying tendencies and behaviours, these findings 
suggest that a multidimensional approach elicits are more detailed picture on the right-wing 
tendency to system-justify.  
Similarly with respect to Study Four, while the multidimensional model did not 
explain much more variance in the outcomes than the unidimensional approach, there were 
some important differential effects for the ideological variables. SDO and the 
Conventionalism dimension of RWA (but not Aggression and Submission) uniquely 
predicted all outcome variables, lending some support to past findings suggesting that right-
wing denial of climate change may occur independently through both RWA and SDO 
(Hoffarth & Hodson, 2016).  
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Although it was beyond the scope of the thesis to focus on an examination of the 
ideological sub-factors of RWA and SDO, interesting results were found with respect to the 
RWA sub-factors in particular. These differences have been alluded to previously and merit 
mention. The total effects of the RWA dimensions Aggression and Submission in Study Four 
were comparatively small and, in almost every case, statistically nonsignificant, with 
Conventionalism the only RWA sub-factor that significantly predicted climate change denial 
in the path model. This may suggest that Conventionalism, an ideological dimension 
representing social ideology or a resistance to change, is the most relevant sub-factor of 
RWA when examining right-wing climate change policy support. This is not to say that 
Submission and Aggression are ideological sub-factors not worthy of examination, however 
if the practicalities of study design do not allow for a more expansive look at these 
ideological effects then it is recommended that Conventionalism should be the primary RWA 
sub-factor of interest. 
These findings provide a more detailed understanding of the ideological effects of 
climate change denial. The multidimensional model of ideology uncovers the complexity of 
the ideology-climate change denial relationship by way of illustrating the different 
ideological paths to denial, through climate change mitigation threat. Such effects could be 
replicated in other polarised policy areas where system threat may be a factor. In particular, 
issues involving acceptance of scientific evidence may be specifically amenable to the 
multidimensional approach, given the finding in this study that the effect of Conventionalism 
on climate science denial was stronger than for SDO.  
Theoretical Implications for System Justification Theory  
Study Three found that system threat did not mediate the relationship between right-wing 
ideology and system-justifying tendencies, which challenges the SJT claim that both chronic 
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perceived system threat should lead individuals and right-wing adherents in particular to 
system-justify. The role of threat in the right-wing tendency to system-justify may be a 
process that largely occurs situationally and with respect to the threatening context, as 
opposed to chronic threat perception being the right-wing path to system justification. Indeed, 
most evidence of the role of threat in system justification come from studies which used 
threat manipulations (Jost et al., 2005; Kay et al., 2005; Ullrich & Cohrs, 2007; Wakslak et 
al., 2011) as opposed to measures of chronic threat in the individual. These threat 
manipulations usually involve a passage describing a threats to the security or safety of the 
system, or a decline in social, economic and political conditions. The system-justifying 
tendency may be more likely to be activated in right-wing adherents in the case of salient 
threats rather than a general heightened level of threat perception. As Study Three was the 
first study to examine the role of dispositional threat perception and system-justifying 
tendencies with respect to right-wing ideology, it may be that system justification only occurs 
in a threat context rather than manifesting as a stable tendency in response to a relatively 
stable threat perception tendency. This suggests that while threat did not explain the right-
wing tendency to system-justify, it is possible that a specific type of threat may engage a 
specific type of system justifying behaviour. Indeed, findings from the fourth study 
examining the role of a specific threat in climate change mitigation threat partially explained 
the right-wing tendency to deny climate change, thereby reducing the need for system-
threatening climate change mitigation and maintaining the socioeconomic status quo. It is 
important to note, however, that even this effect, while significant, was small (β=.09 - .14). In 
their totality, these results lend weak support at best for the SJT argument that ideological 
differences in climate change denial are driven by the threat posed by mitigation efforts. 
Furthermore, and as mentioned earlier, due to the nature of the data collected and the 
analyses conducted, it is difficult to conclude that these findings offer support for an SJT 
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account for climate change denial, given that these findings could be interpreted as 
representing solution aversion (Campbell & Kay, 2014) or ideologically-motivated reasoning 
(Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2016). 
Implications for Climate Change Denial Research 
Although there were no substantial differences in effect sizes for the prediction of the four 
climate change denial types, they were nonetheless independent (but strongly related) 
outcome variables. Given what is known with respect to the tendency to deny different types 
of denial (for instance, denying that climate change will result in negative impacts, yet accept 
that humans are at least partially to blame for it), the multifactorial approach to climate 
change may be suitable in future studies investigating the interplay between these different 
climate change denial types.  
 Similarly, that both RWA and SDO uniquely predict climate change denial types 
suggests that there are at least two different right-wing ideological routes to denial that should 
be further investigated when attempting to understand the ideological antecedents of denial. 
However, given that there were only weak effects for climate change mitigation threat on the 
relationship between right-wing ideology and climate change denial, other approaches to 
understand this relationship may need to be considered. For example, a fruitful approach may 
be to consider the ideological aversion to specific climate change mitigation solutions as a 
factor in climate change denial (Campbell & Kay, 2014). It is possible that right-wing 
adherents who do not see climate change mitigation as a system threat per se still have 
negative attitudes towards certain types of mitigation such as carbon pricing and regulatory 
frameworks that put limits on businesses and the free market. Such an approach also has the 
advantage of examining, in some detail, the relative ideological effects on the myriad 
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solutions to climate change, and may highlight the need to tailor solutions to certain regions 
and populations that do not support such impositions on the market.  
Practical Implications for Engaging Community about Climate Change 
If climate change denial in right-wing adherents is partially driven by a perception that 
mitigation strategies such as carbon taxes and transferring to a fossil fuel free energy system 
are threatening to the socioeconomic system, then it is possible that these mitigation types 
will simply remain unappealing unless a change in their perceived threat occurs. One strategy 
might be to focus on the system-maintaining aspects of mitigating climate change. Preventing 
increases in global average temperatures will mitigate the worst effects of climate change, 
such as displacement of populations that will put pressure on societies less affected by the 
impacts of rising sea levels. Furthermore, mitigating climate change also has the effect of 
maintaining a long-term standard of living and national security, which will all be affected by 
climate change. As such, instead of highlighting the broader catastrophic environmental 
effects of climate change and the need for mitigation to limit these, pitching climate change 
mitigation as a way of reducing specific threats to the system may be more persuasive for 
right-wing adherents.   
On the other hand, the focus could switch to selling policies that are less normatively 
threatening to the socioeconomic practices, such as incentives for individuals and businesses 
to switch to green energy, purchasing of solar panels, divesting from fossil fuel companies, 
and other economic participation options that are individual acts not mandated by the 
government. Although these approaches alone are unlikely to halt average temperature 
increases in a timely manner, it may at least begin to change the normative socioeconomic 
practices around the reliance on fossil fuels in segments of societies that are particularly 
ideologically opposed to stronger, government-mandated measures such as carbon taxes. 
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Limitations of the Research and Future Directions 
As qualitative and correlational research methods were used in studies reported in this thesis, 
causal relationships between variables cannot be asserted. This is particularly important to 
note with respect to Study Four, and in particular the assumed directionality of the statistical 
mediation. While the decision to consider climate change mitigation threat as a mediator was 
based on theoretical considerations, it is possible that climate change denial among right-
wing adherents is driving their level of perceived climate change mitigation threat, as 
opposed to mitigation threat driving denial. Beliefs that climate change mitigation policies 
are threatening the socioeconomic status quo could act as a post-hoc justification for denying 
climate change.  
Studies One, Two and Three only sampled participants from Australia, whereas Study 
Four, which investigated climate change denial, included only participants from the United 
States. As such there is a clear national and cultural bias in the sampling that means it is 
difficult to generalise the findings to other nations and cultures with different socio-political 
contexts, and different core attitudes to the environment and climate change. As such, 
interpretation of these findings needs to take into account the specificity of the national and 
cultural samples. Future research should address the lack of research comparing climate 
change attitudes and their political correlates across nations to gather a broader sense of the 
effect of politically-motivated reasoning in the climate change domain. This would also help 
to elicit a better understanding of the specific political contexts and variables that give rise to 
polarisation. For instance, comparing the relative level of climate change denial in right-wing 
political parties, leaders and partisans across national and cultural political contexts to 
examine the top-down effects of party and leader stances regarding climate change on 
partisan supporters. 
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With respect to partisanship, studies presented in this thesis did not examine, or 
control for, the effects of partisan identity on climate change denial, and instead focused on 
political ideology. Although this approach was justified in Chapter Five, given that focusing 
only on political partisans excludes independents that are ideological, it is nonetheless a 
known factor (Hornsey et al., 2016). Disentangling the psychological antecedents and 
consequences of political ideology and political partisanship may be a worthy approach to 
gain a deeper understanding of the political dimension of climate change denial. For example, 
although an individual might be ideologically right-wing, they may not have a strong right-
wing partisan identity and therefore the level of climate change denial may be lower as a 
result, as they are potentially less likely to follow the cues of right-wing party positions. It 
also could be that partisanship and ideology, as related but unique variables, may have 
additive effects on denial. Additionally, the psychological mechanisms that lead both right-
wing partisans and ideological adherents to denial may be different, and therefore there is 
utility in understanding these differences to further understand the drivers of policy support. 
By extension of the previous point, examining the influence of not just political party 
identification (partisan identity) but also ideological identification (i.e. identification as a 
conservative) would be another important step to disentangle the multitude of political and 
ideological variables that are contributing to climate change denial. Furthermore, given the 
various theoretical approaches positing ideological and identification processes for climate 
change denial (McCright & Dunlap, 2011a), as well as the data supporting an account that 
both processes are at play (Hornsey et al., 2016), future research could examine the relative 
contribution of ideological identity and ideological beliefs on the tendency to not only deny 
climate change but also support for mitigation. 
Finally, the SJT approach to climate change denial necessitated that denial be 
considered a system-justifying behaviour. However, given the nature of our study design it is 
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difficult to conclude that participants high in climate change denial and high in perceived 
mitigation threat are denying climate change as a way to protect the system from threat. It is 
possible that mitigation threat is driving denial through solution aversion (Campbell & Kay, 
2014) That is, mitigation strategies such as carbon taxes and regulating fossil fuel use do not 
appeal to right-wingers on the basis of ideological incongruence, not exclusively because of a 
heightened need to justify the system. As mentioned earlier, it may be possible to not 
perceive ideologically-incongruent climate change mitigation solutions as threatening, yet 
have a negative opinion of them primarily as a function of that incongruence. As an example, 
a right-wing adherent who supports reduced government intervention may not perceive a 
price on carbon as threatening to the socioeconomic status quo, but may feel as though it is an 
intrusion into the market that represents a challenge to their core ideological beliefs. 
Concluding Remarks 
This thesis sought to understand the underlying psychological processes in the right-wing 
denial of climate change, using a multidimensional model of ideology (Dual Process Model) 
to gather a more nuanced understanding of the ideological effects on climate change denial. 
This is particularly valuable given the politically-polarised nature of climate change at both 
the community and policy level, and the urgent need to reduce fossil fuel emissions to 
prevent average global temperatures passing a dangerous point. A System Justification 
Theory approach was adopted to examine the explanatory role that heightened levels of 
perceived threat that climate change mitigation poses to the socioeconomic status quo has on 
this ideology-climate change denial relationship. The results presented in this thesis provide 
evidence that the threat to the socioeconomic system presented by common policy-level 
mitigation solutions such as carbon taxes and reduction in fossil fuel use for energy may 
partially explain the tendency to right-wing adherents to deny climate change. If right-wing 
adherents are denying climate change in part to avoid solutions that are perceived to be 
111 
 
 
 
system-threatening, this may indicate that the way mitigation policies are framed is important 
in terms of gathering support across the political spectrum in general. Specifically, given that 
both types of right-wing ideology (conventionalism and SDO) were significant predictors of 
climate change denial and were both partially mediated, it is possible that different 
approaches regarding the communication and justification of policy are needed to appeal to 
these different types of right-wing adherents.  
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Appendix A  
Ethics Approval, Plain Language Statements and Consent Forms for Studies 
 
 
Memo 
To: Dr Janine Webb 
School of Psychology 
From: Secretary – HEAG-H 
Faculty of Health 
CC: Edward Clarke 
Date: 19 August 2013 
Re: HEAG-H 102_2013:  The relationship between ideology, system justification 
and climate change denial:  A qualitative study 
 
Approval has been given for Dr Janine Webb,  School of Psychology, to undertake this 
project for a period of 1 year from 19 August, 2013. The current end date for this project is 
19 August 2014. 
 
The approval given by the Deakin University HEAG - H is given only for the project and 
for the period as stated in the approval. It is your responsibility to contact the 
Secretary immediately should any of the following occur: 
• Serious or unexpected adverse effects on the participants 
• Any proposed changes in the protocol, including extensions of time 
• Any events which might affect the continuing ethical acceptability of the project 
• The project is discontinued before the expected date of completion 
• Modifications that have been requested by other Human Research Ethics 
Committees 
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In addition you will be required to report on the progress of your project at least once every 
year and at the conclusion of the project.  Failure to report as required will result in 
suspension of your approval to proceed with the project. 
 
An Annual Project Report Form can be found at:  
http://www.deakin.edu.au/hmnbs/research/ethics/ethicssubmissionprocess.php 
This should be completed and returned to the Administrative Officer to the HEAG-H, Pro-
Vice Chancellor’s office, Faculty of Health, Burwood campus by Tuesday 19th November, 
2013 and when the project is completed. HEAG-H may need to audit this project as part of 
the requirements for monitoring set out in the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in 
Human Research (2007). 
 
Good luck with the project! 
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PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM 
 
TO:   
 
 
Plain Language Statement  
Date: 
Full Project Title:  The relationship between ideology, system justification, and climate 
change denial: A Qualitative Study 
Principal Researcher: Dr. Janine Webb 
Student Researcher: Edward Clarke 
Associate Researcher(s):  
 
 
Purpose 
You are invited to participate in this project which aims to better understand 
perceptions and experiences of ‘climate change’ and ‘denial’ of climate change. These 
findings will allow us to explore the adequacy of prior research and its conceptualisation and 
understanding of these concepts. 
 
Expected benefits to the wider community 
It is expected that this project will benefit the wider community by improving our 
understanding of people’s perceptions of climate change and aspects of denial of climate 
change.  
Payment 
A lottery will be held so that you will have the opportunity to win a $100 Coles-Myer 
voucher to compensate you for your time. (One winner will be selected at random). 
Funding 
This research is totally funded by the School of Psychology at Deakin University.  
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Demands 
By agreeing to participate in this study, you are agreeing to participate in a short, semi-
structured interview (approximately half an hour) that will be tape-recorded and then 
transcribed. 
The questions will be open-ended, and the interview will be fairly informal. The questions 
you will be asked are just prompts for you to describe your perceptions of ‘climate change’ 
and ‘climate change denial’. 
Methods 
The interview will be approximately half an hour in length and will take place at Deakin 
University, or over the phone, at a time mutually agreed upon between the student 
researcher and yourself. The interviews will be recorded using a digital voice tape recorder. 
Some notes may also be made during the interview about relevant body language, 
expressions, pauses or emphasis on wording to assist in the interpretation of interviews. 
The emerging data will be transcribed verbatim onto a Microsoft Word document and will 
be subsequently analysed by the student researcher. The analysis will entail coding the data 
to identify emerging themes from the interviews. 
Risks and potential benefits to participants 
The risk of harm to you is not expected to be greater than that experienced in everyday life.  
However, it is recognized that you may feel uncomfortable having your voice recorded 
during the interview. Therefore, questions do not have to be answered if you deem them 
inappropriate, and the interview can be stopped at any time.  
Furthermore, due to the nature of qualitative research, some quoting of you, or details of 
your experiences, will appear in the final paper and any publication of the research. 
However, these written quotes will not refer to you by name (any names used in the final 
research paper will be pseudonyms) and no personally identifying information will appear in 
any publications.   
Audio recordings of interviews will be stored separately as soon as they are transcribed, 
handwritten notes will be shredded once typed out, and any typed data will then be kept on 
a computer. At the conclusion of the study all data shall be transferred to a CD disk and kept 
in a secure, locked room at Deakin University. You have the right to review and edit your 
interview transcript at any time before the conclusion of the study. 
How your privacy and confidentiality will be protected 
The data collected will be identifiable as your voice and experiences are unique.  However, 
any names used in the final research paper(s) will be pseudonyms, and no personally 
identifying information will appear and will be treated as confidential. Also, the audio tape 
recording of your interview will be stored separately as soon as the recording is transcribed, 
and any handwritten notes will be shredded as soon as they are typed out.    
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How you can access results of the study, including publications 
The research, in a non-identifiable form, will be reported in a PhD thesis and may be 
presented at a conference. You are able to contact Dr. Janine Webb at the completion of the 
study for a copy of the results.  
The research may also be submitted to a professional journal for publication if deemed 
appropriate. In this case, you are able to contact Dr. Janine Webb for a copy of the 
publication. 
How the research will be monitored 
At all stages of this study, the research will be monitored by Dr. Janine Webb (principal 
investigator). If you have any queries, complaints or concerns about the research project, 
you can contact Dr. Janine Webb on (03) 924 43753 or at Janine.Webb@deakin.edu.au. 
Provision of services to participants adversely affected by the research 
If you have any queries, complaints or concerns about the research project, you can contact 
Dr. Janine Webb on (03) 924 43753 or at Janine.Webb@deakin.edu.au. 
Your rights 
You have the right to withdraw from further participation at any stage of the interview, in 
which case any recordings and transcripts made of your interview will be destroyed straight 
away and will not be used in the research. 
You have the right to decline to answer any questions if you experience discomfort. 
You also have the right to personally review your interview transcript and edit it at any stage 
before analysis. 
Complaints 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being conducted or 
any questions about your rights as a research participant, then you may contact:   
 
The Manager, Research Integrity, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood 
Victoria 3125, Telephone: 9251 7129, Facsimile: 9244 6581; research-ethics@deakin.edu.au 
 
Please quote project number [201X-XXX]. 
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 PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT AND CONSENT FORM 
 
TO:  Mr. Edward Clarke and Dr Janine Webb 
 
Consent Form 
Date: 
Full Project Title: The relationship between ideology, system justification, and climate 
change denial: A qualitative study. 
Reference Number: 
 
 
I have read and I understand the attached Plain Language Statement. 
I freely agree to participate in this project according to the conditions in the Plain Language 
Statement.  
I have been given a copy of the Plain Language Statement and Consent Form to keep.  
The researcher has agreed not to reveal my identity and personal details, including where 
information about this project is published, or presented in any public form.   
I specifically consent to this interview being tape recorded, in the knowledge that the 
recording will be deleted as soon as it is transcribed. I am also aware that I have the right to 
contact the researcher to personally review and edit my transcript at any time before the 
research is analysed. 
 
Participant’s Name (printed) …………………………………………………………………… 
Signature ……………………………………………………… Date  ………………………… 
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Memo 
 
Approval has been given for Dr Janine McGuinness, School of Psychology, to undertake this 
project for a period of 1 year from 22 November, 2013. The current end date for this project is 
22 November, 2014. 
 
The approval given by the Deakin University HEAG - H is given only for the 
project and for the period as stated in the approval. It is your responsibility 
to contact the Secretary immediately should any of the following occur: 
• Serious or unexpected adverse effects on the participants 
• Any proposed changes in the protocol, including extensions of time 
• Any events which might affect the continuing ethical acceptability of the project 
• The project is discontinued before the expected date of completion 
• Modifications that have been requested by other Human Research Ethics 
Committees 
 
In addition you will be required to report on the progress of your project at least once every 
year and at the conclusion of the project.  Failure to report as required will result in 
suspension of your approval to proceed with the project. 
 
To: Dr Janine McGuinness 
School of Psychology 
From: Secretary – HEAG-H 
Faculty of Health 
CC: Edward Clarke 
Date: 22 November, 2013 
Re: HEAG-H165_2013   Exploring the relationship between system justification 
and the dual process model of ideology 
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An Annual Project Report Form can be found at:  
http://www.deakin.edu.au/hmnbs/research/ethics/ethicssubmissionprocess.php 
This should be completed and returned to the Administrative Officer to the HEAG-H, Pro-
Vice Chancellor’s office, Faculty of Health, Burwood campus by Tuesday 18th November, 
2014 and when the project is completed. HEAG-H may need to audit this project as part of 
the requirements for monitoring set out in the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in 
Human Research (2007). 
 
Good luck with the project! 
 
  
136 
 
 
 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT  
 
TO:   
 
 
Plain Language Statement  
Date: 
Full Project Title:  Exploring the relationship between system justification and the dual 
process model of ideology. 
Principal Researcher: Dr Janine McGuinness 
Student Researcher: Edward Clarke 
Associate Researcher(s):  
 
 
Purpose 
You are invited to participate in this project which aims to better understand the 
relationship of people’s support for current social systems in society to their political beliefs.  
Expected benefits to the wider community 
It is expected that this project will benefit the wider community as it will assist us in future 
studies to examine issues such as the effect of ideology on types of climate change belief. 
Payment 
A lottery will be held so that you will have the opportunity to win a $100 Coles-Myer 
voucher to compensate you for your time. (One winner will be selected at random). 
Funding 
This research is totally funded by the School of Psychology at Deakin University.  
Demands 
By agreeing to participate in this study, you are agreeing to complete a questionnaire that 
will take no more than half an hour to complete. Items in the questionnaire will typically ask 
you to indicate your level of agreement to certain statements, such as “In general, you find 
society to be fair.” 
Methods 
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The questionnaire will take approximately 20 minutes to complete, and will be conducted 
online. The questionnaire will ask you some demographic questions, and will also ask you to 
indicate your level of agreement to a number of different statements measuring ideological 
belief, such as “If people work hard, they almost always get what they want.” 
The questionnaire is completely voluntary and anonymous and it is important that you do 
not include any identifying features about yourself in the questionnaire so that we, nor 
anybody else, will be able to link this information to you.   
Risks and potential benefits to participants 
The risk of harm to you is not expected to be greater than that experienced in everyday life.   
How your privacy and confidentiality will be protected 
Only researchers associated with this project will have access to the collected data, and it is 
kept in secure storage for 5 years, in line with Deakin University regulations. A report of the 
study may be submitted for publication, but individual participants will not be identifiable in 
such a report, as only anonymous, aggregated data will be reported.  
You will be offered the opportunity to be included in a lottery to win a $100 Coles-Myer gift 
voucher at the end of the survey. Your email address will be collected at the completion of 
the questionnaire, on the last page. However, these addresses will be stored separately 
from the data and destroyed subsequent to the drawing of the lottery so as to keep your 
questionnaire responses anonymous. The lottery will be conducted by an independent staff 
member in the School of Psychology. No other incentives will be provided.  
How you can access results of the study, including publications 
The research, in a non-identifiable form, will be reported in a PhD thesis and may be 
presented at a conference. You are able to contact Dr. Janine McGuinness at the completion 
of the study for a copy of the results.  
The research may also be submitted to a professional journal for publication if deemed 
appropriate. In this case, you are able to contact Dr. Janine Webb for a copy of the 
publication. 
How the research will be monitored 
At all stages of this study, the research will be monitored by Dr. Janine McGuinness 
(principal investigator). If you have any queries, complaints or concerns about the research 
project, you can contact Dr. Janine McGuinness on (03) 924 43753 or at 
Janine.Webb@deakin.edu.au. 
Provision of services to participants adversely affected by the research 
If you have any queries, complaints or concerns about the research project, you can contact 
Dr. Janine McGuinness on (03) 924 43753 or at Janine.Webb@deakin.edu.au. 
Your rights 
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You have the right to withdraw from further participation at any stage of the survey, in 
which case any responses to questions will be deleted straight away and will not be used in 
the research. 
You have the right to decline to answer any questions if you experience discomfort. 
You also have the right to personally review your responses and edit it at any stage before 
analysis. 
Complaints 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being conducted or 
any questions about your rights as a research participant, then you may contact:   
 
The Manager, Research Integrity, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood 
Victoria 3125, Telephone: 9251 7129, Facsimile: 9244 6581; research-ethics@deakin.edu.au 
 
Please quote project number [2013-165]. 
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Memo 
 
Approval has been given for Dr Janine McGuinness and Dr Ben Richardson, School of 
Psychology, to undertake this project for a period of 1 year from 5 October, 2015. The 
current end date for this project is 5 October, 2016. 
The approval given by the Deakin University HEAG - H is given only for the 
project and for the period as stated in the approval. It is your responsibility 
to contact the Secretary immediately should any of the following occur: 
• Serious or unexpected adverse effects on the participants 
• Any proposed changes in the protocol, including extensions of time 
• Any events which might affect the continuing ethical acceptability of the project 
• The project is discontinued before the expected date of completion 
• Modifications that have been requested by other Human Research Ethics 
Committees 
 
In addition you will be required to report on the progress of your project at least once every 
year and at the conclusion of the project.  Failure to report as required will result in 
suspension of your approval to proceed with the project. 
 
To: Dr Janine McGuinness, Dr Ben Richardson 
School of Psychology 
From: Secretary – HEAG-H 
Faculty of Health 
CC: Edward Clarke 
Date: 5 October 2015 
Re: HEAG-H 137_2015:  The Relationship between Ideology and Climate Change 
Belief 
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An Annual Project Report Form can be found at:  
http://www.deakin.edu.au/hmnbs/research/ethics/ethicssubmissionprocess.php 
This should be completed and returned to the Administrative Officer to the HEAG-H, Pro-
Vice Chancellor’s office, Faculty of Health, Burwood campus by Tuesday 17th November, 
2015 and when the project is completed. HEAG-H may need to audit this project as part of 
the requirements for monitoring set out in the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in 
Human Research (2007). 
 
Good luck with the project! 
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PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT 
Full Project Title: The Relationship between Ideology and Belief in Climate Change 
(Pilot Study) 
Principal Researchers: Mr Edward Clarke (PhD candidate), Dr Janine McGuinness, 
& Dr Ben Richardson. 
 
Thank you for following up on our invitation to seek more information regarding our study, 
we truly appreciate your interest. Please read on for a description of our study, after which 
you are invited to participate. 
Purpose 
This pilot study intends to examine the internal consistency of an existing climate change 
belief scale, as well as assist in the development of two climate change threat scales. 
Demands 
This study will utilize a 10-minute online questionnaire, hosted on a Deakin server. This 
questionnaire will contain items pertaining to your beliefs and perceptions with respect to 
climate change and related concepts. 
Risks and Benefits 
No risks are anticipated for any participants. As this study will aid in the development of 
scales that will be used in future studies on the topic of ideology and belief in climate 
change, the benefits to any individual participant are likely to be extremely indirect. 
Privacy and Confidentiality Protection 
Your responses will be collected in a wholly anonymous format, so your privacy and 
confidentiality is assured. 
Data from this study will be stored for a minimum of 5 years, according to Deakin’s 
protocols, before being permanently destroyed. Until then, digital data will be stored on 
Deakin’s secure server. 
Dissemination of Results 
It is the intent of the research team to publish averaged findings of this research in peer-
reviewed articles, and utilise them in the completion of Edward Clarke’s PhD thesis. If you 
would like to receive a summary of results, please contact Edward at eclarke@deakin.edu.au 
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Incentives 
There are no incentives for this pilot study 
Conflicts of interest 
The researchers have no conflicts of interest to declare. 
Your Rights 
This is a voluntary study, so you should feel under no pressure to participate. Further, you 
may withdraw at any time up to the completion of your online questionnaire. However, as 
your responses are unidentifiable, your data cannot be removed from analysis upon request 
once you submit your responses and complete the survey. 
More information? 
If you want to know more before participating, or just want to find out more about this 
research please contact: Edward Clarke eclarke@deakin.edu.au 
Complaints 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being conducted or 
any questions about your rights as a research participant, then you may contact: 
The Manager, Research Integrity, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood 
Victoria 3125, Telephone: (03) 9251 7129, research-ethics@deakin.edu.au 
Please quote project number [2015-137]. 
By clicking the "Begin Survey" button below, you are agreeing that you have read and 
understood the Plain Language Statement and that you are consenting to participate 
in this research. 
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PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT 
Full Project Title: The Relationship between Ideology and Belief in Climate Change 
Principal Researchers: Mr Edward Clarke (PhD candidate), Dr Janine McGuinness, & 
Dr Ben Richardson. 
 
Thank you for following up on our invitations to seek more information regarding our study, 
we truly appreciate your interest. Please read on for a description of our study, after which 
you are invited to participate. 
Purpose 
This study intends to investigate the relationship between ideological beliefs, political 
identification, and beliefs about climate change. 
Demands 
This study will utilize a 15-minute online questionnaire, hosted on a Deakin server. This 
questionnaire will contain items pertaining to your ideological beliefs and opinions on social, 
economic and political issues, identification with ideological groups, as well as your beliefs 
and perceptions about climate change and related concepts. 
Risks and Benefits 
No risks are anticipated for any participants. Any benefits to any individual participant are 
likely to be only very indirect at most. Results may be published in peer-reviewed journals, 
therefore findings from this study may be considered by policy-makers interested in 
environmental attitudes of citizens. 
Privacy and Confidentiality Protection 
Amazon MTurk will provide the researchers with “Worker IDs” of all participants for the 
purposes of approving compensation. Worker IDs will not be shared with anyone outside of 
the research team. Furthermore, MTurk worker IDs will only be collected for the purposes of 
distributing study compensation and will not be associated with survey responses. 
 
Data from this study will be stored for a minimum of 5 years, according to Deakin’s 
protocols, before being permanently destroyed. Until then, digital data will be stored on 
Deakin’s secure server. 
Dissemination of Results 
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It is the intent of the research team to publish averaged findings of this research in peer-
reviewed articles, and utilise them in the completion of Edward Clarke’s PhD thesis. If you 
would like to receive a summary of results, please contact Edward at eclarke@deakin.edu.au 
Incentives 
As a reimbursement for your time and efforts you will receive $1.50 as dispensed through the 
Amazon MTurk service. 
Conflicts of interest 
The researchers have no conflicts of interest to declare. The research is fully funded 
internally by the School of Psychology. 
Your Rights 
This is a voluntary study, so you should feel under no pressure to participate. Further, you 
may withdraw at any time up to the completion of your online questionnaire. However, as 
your responses are unidentifiable, your data cannot be removed from analysis upon request 
once you submit your responses and complete the survey. 
More information? 
If you want to know more before participating, or just want to find out more about this 
research please contact: Edward Clarke eclarke@deakin.edu.au 
Complaints 
If you have any complaints about any aspect of the project, the way it is being conducted or 
any questions about your rights as a research participant, then you may contact: 
The Manager, Research Integrity, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood 
Victoria 3125, Telephone: 011 61 3 9251 7129, research-ethics@deakin.edu.au 
 
Please quote project number [2015-137]. 
 
 
By clicking the "Begin Survey" button below, you are agreeing that you have read and 
understood the Plain Language Statement and that you are consenting to participate in 
this research. 
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Appendix B 
List of Papers and Conference Presentations 
Papers: 
Clarke, E., Ling. M., Kothe. E., & Richardson, B. (under review). Perceived Mitigation 
Threat Mediates Effects of Right-Wing Ideology on Climate Change Beliefs. Journal 
of Environmental Psychology. https://osf.io/3t9tg/ 
Conference Presentations: 
Clarke, E., & Richardson, B. (2017, April). Mitigation threat and the relationship between 
climate change denial and right-wing ideology. Paper presented at SASP-SPSSI 
Conference on The Morality of Conflict and Cooperation, Melbourne. 
Clarke, E., & Richardson, B. (2016, March). Mitigation threat and the relationship between 
climate change denial and ideology. Paper presented at the Society of Australasian 
Social Psychologists (SASP) Conference, Brisbane. 
Clarke, E. (2015, April). Investigating the relationships between types of system justification, 
threat, and a two-dimensional model of conservatism. Paper presented at the Society 
of Australasian Social Psychologists (SASP) Conference, Newcastle. 
Clarke, E. & McGuinness, J. (2014, July) Subjective beliefs and perceptions regarding 
climate change and climate change denial: A qualitative study. Poster presented at the 
International Society of Political Psychologists (ISPP) Conference, Rome. 
Clarke, E. & McGuinness, J. (2014, April) Subjective beliefs and perceptions regarding 
climate change and climate change denial: A qualitative study. Paper presented at the 
Society of Australasian Social Psychologists (SASP) Conference, Canberra. 
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Appendix C 
C.1 Path Models for Study Three 
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Path model for unidimensional model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Saturated mediation model predicting general system justification and economic system justification. All residuals of outcome variables were 
allowed to correlate. **p <.01 
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Dangerous World 
Belief 
General System 
Justification 
Economic System 
Justification 
R2=.26 
R2=.33 
R2=.10 
.31** 
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Path model for multidimensional model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Saturated mediation model predicting general system justification and economic system justification. All residuals of outcome variables were 
allowed to correlate, and predictor variables were also allowed to correlate. **p <.01 
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R2=.26 
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C.2 Path Models for Study Four
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Path model for unidimensional model (*p<.05) 
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R2 = .46 
R2 = .39 
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Path model for multidimensional model (*p<.05) 
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R2 = .48 
R2 = .47 
R2 = .45 
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Appendix D 
D.1 Interview Materials for Study One  
1. What is your age? 
2. What is your gender? 
3.  What is your current occupation? 
4.  What is your highest level of education attained? 
5.  Please describe what comes to mind when you hear the term ‘climate change’ 
6.  Please describe what comes to mind when you hear the term ‘global warming’ 
7. Please describe what comes to mind when you hear the term ‘climate change denial’ 
8. Please describe what comes to mind when you hear the term ‘climate change 
scepticism’ 
9.  What is your belief regarding the existence of climate change?  
9a.  Have you experienced anything that you believe might be the result of climate 
change?  
  If yes, please describe this/these experience(s). 
 9b.  What do you think might be the cause or causes of climate change? 
9c.  Do you believe that humans are the cause of climate change? 
  If yes, to what extent? 
 9d.  Do you believe that climate change will lead to dire consequences? 
  If yes, please describe. 
 9e. Do you feel empowered to do anything about climate change? 
9e. What are your thoughts regarding the nature of the scientific evidence 
surrounding climate change? 
9f. What are your impressions of the media representation of the issue of climate 
change? 
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D.2 Questionnaire Materials for Study Two 
* denotes reverse-coded items 
Gender:  
Age: 
Climate Change Denial Scale (Häkkinen & Akrami, 2014)  
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
1. I am not convinced that the Earth's climate has warmed up over the last century. 
2. I find it hard to believe that the earth's climate is really changing. 
3. My opinion is that Earth's climate shows a pronounced increase in temperature.* 
4. I believe that climate change is occurring.* 
5. Climate change is a result of human activities such as burning fossil fuels.* 
6. Climate change is just a result of natural variation in the climate. 
7. Warming of the climate on earth is not due to human influence. 
8. The temperature on Earth varies naturally. 
9. Human activity is causing changes in the climate* 
10. Climate change will affect the Earth negatively* 
11. Climate change will not affect the life on Earth in any significant way. 
12. My opinion is that we will not even notice the effects of climate change. 
13. The so-called "climate threat" is exaggerated. 
14. The seriousness of climate change is exaggerated in the media. 
15. A few degrees here or there in climate change will not affect life on Earth. 
16. Many people underestimate the seriousness of climate change.* 
17. I do not believe that scientists are in agreement on the issue of climate change. 
18. I believe that there is enough scientific evidence to confirm the changes in Earth's 
climate.* 
19. I think the evidence for climate change is far too weak. 
20. Scientific evidence overwhelmingly supports the notion that the climate is changing.* 
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Climate Change Mitigation Threat Scale.  
(1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
 
1. Attempts by governments to reduce carbon emissions to slow climate change will 
threaten our economic prosperity. 
2. Our way of life will be negatively affected by attempts to slow or reduce the effects of 
climate change. 
3. Efforts to halt greenhouse gas emissions by governments simply drive up energy 
prices, which decreases my standard of living. 
4. Government policies suggested to address climate change such as carbon taxes and 
caps on pollution threaten my standard of living. 
5. Policies to address climate change (such as caps on pollution and carbon taxes) will 
not cost me much money personally.* 
6. Policies to address climate change such as caps on pollution and carbon taxes will not 
threaten my personal economic and financial prosperity.* 
7. Policies to address climate change such as caps on pollution and carbon taxes will not 
endanger our economy.* 
8. A minor increase in the cost of living due to government policies (such as carbon 
taxes or caps on pollution) does not worry me.* 
9. Attempts by governments to reduce carbon emissions to slow climate change will also 
slow the growth of our economy. 
10. Attempts by governments to address climate change only harms my standard of 
living. 
 
 
Climate Change Threat Scale 
7pt scale. (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
 
1. If nothing substantial is done about climate change, it will threaten our way of life. 
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2. Climate change might seem bad to some, but I am not too concerned. We will figure 
out a way to deal with it.* 
3. The threat of climate change is greater than the supposed short-term economic pain 
we will face in dealing with it. 
4. Climate change may or may not be problem for future generations. Regardless, I do 
not feel threatened by its effects in the here and now.* 
5. I find climate change a threat to my way of life. 
6. I feel threatened by the prospect of climate change and associated environmental 
effects. 
7. I feel climate change will not affect me or my family in the near future.* 
8. Climate change threatens the very existence of humanity. 
9. Although the major effects of climate change may not happen in my life time, it is 
still a grave threat to humanity. 
10. Climate change may affect the environment, but it does not threaten human 
existence.* 
11. Climate change may affect the environment, but it will not adversely harm my own 
way of life.* 
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D.3 Questionnaire materials for Study Three 
* denotes reverse-coded items 
Gender:  
• Male 
• Female 
• Other  
Age in years: [text box] 
Occupation: [text box] 
Nationality:  
• Australian 
• Other 
What is your highest level of education? 
• Did not complete High School 
• High School 
• Completing TAFE 
• TAFE certificate 
• Completing Undergraduate 
• Undergraduate degree 
• Completing Postgraduate 
• Postgraduate 
• Other 
What is your pre-tax household income? 
• No income 
• less than $20,000 
• $20,000 to 40,000 
• $40,001 to 60,000 
• $60,001 to 80,000 
• $80,001 to 100,000 
• $100,001 to 120,000 
• greater than $120,000 
• Prefer not to say 
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Which political party best aligns with your values? 
• Liberal 
• ALP 
• Nationals 
• Greens 
• Family First 
• Sex Party 
• Palmer United Party 
• Other 
• Prefer not to say 
To what extent are your political beliefs aligned with this party? (1=not at all, 
7=strongly aligned) 
How strongly do you identify with this party? (1=not at all, 7=strongly identify) 
Which party do you usually vote for? 
• Liberal 
• ALP 
• Nationals 
• Greens 
• Family First 
• Sex Party 
• Palmer United Party 
• Independent 
• Other 
• My vote changes from election to election 
• Prefer not to say 
Which party did you vote for in the 2013 Federal election? 
• Liberal 
• ALP 
• Nationals 
• Greens 
• Family First 
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• Sex Party 
• Palmer United Party 
• Independent 
• Other 
• Prefer not to say 
 
Cultural conservatism (Crowson, 2009) (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree) 
1. People who do not work for a living are basically “good-for-nothing”.  
2.  Working hard makes you a better person.  
3.  Only when you work for a living, are you a “somebody”. 
4.  A good parent will make sure his/her children are obedient at all times.  
5.  Smart parents teach their children who’s “the boss” from an early age. 
6.  It is better for parents to be strict when raising their children.  
7.  It would be better for society if the woman would take care of the home and the husband 
earn the money. 
8. A woman is more suited to raise small children than a man.  
9. It is always better for a woman to stay at home with her children when they are small. 
10.  Unmarried young people do not do anything wrong when they sleep together.* 
11.  A doctor should be allowed to end a person’s suffering if the patient explicitly asks for 
it.* 
12.  Abortion should remain illegal under all circumstances.  
 
Economic conservatism (Crowson, 2009) (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree) 
1.  The wealthy have an unfair advantage in our society 
2.  Taxes on high incomes should be increased. * 
3.  The government should never penalize big businesses for seeking ways to maximize their 
profits.  
4.  Labor unions are a huge benefit to workers.*  
5.  Big businesses enrich themselves at the expense of the workers. 
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6.  Class differences ought to be smaller than what they are today.*  
7.  The government should take actions to decrease income differences.* 
8.  Differences between high and low incomes should remain as they are.  
9.  Our country can only get ahead if the government gives the industry free reign to control 
its own affairs. 
 
General System Justification Scale (Kay & Jost, 2003) (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly 
agree) 
1. In general, you find society to be fair 
2. In general, the Australian political system operates as it should  
3. Australian society needs to be radically restructured* 
4. Australia is the best country in the world to live in  
5. Most policies serve the greater good  
6. Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness 
7. Our society is getting worse every year* 
8. Society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve 
Economic System Justification Scale (Jost & Thomson, 2000) (1=strongly disagree, 
9=strongly agree) 
1. If people work hard, they almost always get what they want  
2. The existence of widespread economic differences does not mean that they are inevitable* 
3. Laws of nature are responsible for differences in wealth in society  
4. There are many reasons to think that the economic system is unfair*  
5. It is virtually impossible to eliminate poverty 
6. Poor people are not essentially different from rich people*  
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7. Most people who don’t get ahead in our society should not blame the system. They have 
only themselves to blame  
8. Equal distribution of resources is a possibility for our society*  
9. Social class differences reflect differences in the natural order of things 
10. Economic differences in the society reflect an illegitimate distribution of resources* 
11. There will always be poor people, because there will never be enough jobs for everybody  
12. Economic positions are legitimate reflections of people’s achievements  
13. If people wanted to change the economic system to make things equal, they could* 
14. Equal distribution of resources is unnatural 
15. It is unfair to have an economic system which produces extreme wealth and extreme 
poverty at the same time* 
16. There is no point in trying to make incomes more equal 
17. There are no inherent differences between rich and poor; it is purely a matter of the 
circumstances into which you are born* 
 
Democratic System Justification Scale (Rutto, Russo & Mosso, 2013) (1=strongly 
disagree, 7=strongly agree) 
1. In general, I believe that our democratic system is fair 
2. In general, the Australian political system operates as it should 
3. The Australian political system needs to be radically restructured* 
4. Our democratic system is the best possible 
5. Most policies serve the collective good 
6. Politics is constructed in a mode that is best to move forward 
7. Parties represent the different souls of society 
8. Today politicians act more in favour of lobby groups than of the citizens* 
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Social Dominance Orientation Scale (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994) 
(1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree) 
1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. 
2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups. 
3. It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others. 
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. 
5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. 
6. It's probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the 
bottom. 
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place. 
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. 
9. It would be good if groups could be equal.* 
10. Group equality should be our ideal.* 
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life.* 
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.* 
13. Increased social equality.* 
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.* 
15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.* 
16. No one group should dominate in society.* 
Items 9-16 should be reverse-coded.*  
 
Right wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1998) – (-4 = strongly disagree, 4 = strongly 
agree)  
1.       The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the radicals 
and protestors are usually just “loud mouths” showing off their ignorance 
2.       Women should have to obey their husbands when they get married 
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3.       Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy 
the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us 
4.       Gays and Lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else* 
5.       It is better to trust the judgement of the proper authorities in government and religion than 
to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people’s 
minds 
6.       Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every 
bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly* 
7.       The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional 
values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas. 
8.       There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps* 
9.       Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if this 
upsets many people* 
10.   Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away at 
our moral fibre and traditional beliefs 
11.   Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, even if it 
makes them different from everyone else.* 
12.   The “Old-fashioned ways” and “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live. 
13.   You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority’s view by protesting for 
women’s abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer* 
14.   What this country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and take 
us back to our true path. 
15.   Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, 
criticising religion and ignoring the “normal way things are supposed to be done”* 
16.   God’s laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed before it is 
too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished. 
17.   There are many radical, immoral people in our country today who are trying to ruin it for 
their own godless purposes, who the authorities should put out of action. 
18.   A “woman’s place” should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are 
submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past* 
19.   Our country will be great if we honour the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities 
tell us to do, and get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining everything 
20.   There is no “ONE right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way.* 
21.   Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy “traditional 
family values”* 
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22.   This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would just shut up 
and accept their group’s traditional place in society 
 
Belief in a dangerous World (Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis & Birum, 2002) (1=strongly 
disagree, 7=strongly agree) 
1. Although it may appear that things are constantly getting more dangerous and chaotic, it 
really isn’t so. Every era has its problems, and a person’s chances of living a safe, untroubled 
life are better today than ever before* 
2. Any day now chaos and anarchy could erupt around us. All the signs are pointing to it 
3. There are many dangerous people in our society who will attack someone out of pure 
meanness, for no reason at all 
4. Despite what one hears about “crime in the street,” there probably isn’t any more now than 
there ever has been* 
5. If a person takes a few sensible precautions, nothing bad is likely to happen to him or her; 
we do not live in a dangerous world* 
6. Every day as society become more lawless and bestial, a person’s chances of being robbed, 
assaulted, and even murdered go up and up 
7. My knowledge and experience tells me that the social world we live in is basically a safe, 
stable and secure place in which most people are fundamentally good* 
8. It seems that every year there are fewer and fewer truly respectable people, and more and 
more persons with no morals at all who threaten everyone else 
9. The “end” is not near. People who think that earthquakes, wars, and famines mean God 
might be about to destroy the world are being foolish* 
10. My knowledge and experience tells me that the social world we live in is basically a 
dangerous and unpredictable place, in which good, decent and moral people’s values and way 
of life are threatened and disrupted by bad people 
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Need for Closure Scale (Kruglanski, Webster & Klem, 1993) (1=strongly disagree, 
7=strongly agree) 
1. I think that having clear rules and order at work is essential for success. 
2. Even after I've made up my mind about something, I am always eager to consider a 
different opinion.* 
3. I don't like situations that are uncertain. 
4. I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways. 
5. I like to have friends who are unpredictable.* 
6. I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament. 
7. When dining out, I like to go to places where I have been before so that I know what to 
expect. 
8. I feel uncomfortable when I don't understand the reason why an event occurred in my life. 
9. 1 feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes. 
10. I hate to change my plans at the last minute. 
11. I don't like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it. 
12. When I go shopping, I have difficulty deciding exactly what it is that I want.* 
13. When faced with a problem I usually see the one best solution very quickly. 
14. When 1 am confused about an important issue, I feel very upset. 
15. I tend to put off making important decisions until the last possible moment.* 
16. 1 usually make important decisions quickly and confidently. 
17. I would describe myself as indecisive.* 
18. I think it is fun to change my plans at the last moment.* 
19. I enjoy the uncertainty of going into a new situation without knowing what might 
happen.* 
20. My personal space is usually messy and disorganized.* 
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21. In most social conflicts, I can easily see which side is right and which is wrong. 
22. I tend to struggle with most decisions.* 
23. I believe that orderliness and organization are among the most important characteristics of 
a good student. 
24. When considering most conflict situations, 1 can usually see how both sides could be 
right.* 
25. I don't like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions. 
26. I prefer to socialize with familiar friends because I know what to expect from them. 
27. I think that I would learn best in a class that lacks clearly stated objectives and 
requirements.* 
28. When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different opinions on the issue as 
possible.* 
29. I like to know what people are thinking all the time. 
30. I dislike it when a person's statement could mean many different things. 
31. It's annoying to listen to someone who cannot seem to make up his or her mind. 
32. I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more. 
33. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. 
34. 1 prefer interacting with people whose opinions are very different from my own.* 
35. I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place. 
36. I feel uncomfortable when someone's meaning or intention is unclear to me. 
37. When trying to solve a problem I often see so many possible options that it's confusing.* 
38. 1 always see many possible solutions to problems I face.* 
39. I'd rather know bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty. 
40. I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view. 
41. I dislike unpredictable situations. 
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42. I dislike the routine aspects of my work (studies).* 
 
In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself? 
(0=left, 10=right). 
How confident are you about your above placement? (1 = Not at all confident - 7 = Very 
confident) 
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D.4 Questionnaire Materials for Study Four 
* denotes reverse-coded items 
Gender: Male/Female/Other  
Age in years: [text box] 
Nationality:  
• American 
• Other: Please specify [text box] 
Religion:  
Please specify [text box] 
• No religion 
• Prefer not to say 
Which political party do you support? 
• Democratic 
• Republican 
• Other  
• Independent/do not support a political party 
• Prefer not to say 
Highest level of education:  
• Did not complete high school  
• High school 
• Completing undergraduate degree  
• Undergraduate degree  
• Completing graduate degree  
• Graduate degree  
• Other (please specify) 
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Ideological self-placement item: 
In politics people sometimes talk of liberal and conservative. Where would you place 
yourself? (0=extremely liberal, 10=extremely conservative). 
Social Dominance Orientation – SDO7 short form (Ho et al., 2015) (1= strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree)  
1. An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom.  
2. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.  
3. No one group should dominate in society.* 
4. Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top.* 
5. Group equality should not be our primary goal.  
6. It is unjust to try to make groups equal.  
7. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups.* 
8. We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed.* 
 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (Funke, 2005) (1= strongly disagree, 7 = strongly 
agree)  
1. People should develop their own personal  standards about good and evil and pay less 
attention to the Bible and other old, traditional forms of religious guidance.* 
2. What our country really needs instead of more “civil rights” is a good stiff dose of law 
and order. 
3. The days when women are submissive should belong strictly in the past. A “woman’s 
place” in society should be wherever she wants to be.* 
4. The withdrawal from tradition will turn out to be a fatal fault one day. 
5. There is no such crime to justify capital punishment.* 
6. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values children should 
learn. 
7. Homosexual long-term relationships should be treated as equivalent to marriage.* 
8. What our country really needs is a strong, determined President which will crush evil 
and set us on our right way again. 
9. It is good that nowadays young people have greater freedom “to make their own 
rules” and to protest against things they don’t like.* 
10. Being virtuous and law-abiding is in the long run better for us than permanently 
challenging the foundation of our society. 
11. It is important to protect the rights of radicals and deviants in all ways.* 
12. The real keys to the “good life” are obedience, discipline, and virtue. 
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Climate Change Threat Scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
1. If nothing substantial is done about climate change, it will threaten our way of life  
2. Climate change might seem bad, but I am not too concerned. We will figure out a way to 
deal with it* 
3. Climate change may or may not be problem for future generations. Regardless, I do not 
feel threatened by its effects in the here and now* 
4. I find climate change a threat to my way of life  
5. I feel climate change will not affect me or my family in the near future* 
6. I feel threatened by the prospect of climate change and associated environmental effects  
7. Climate change may affect the environment, but it will not adversely harm my own way of 
life* 
8. Climate change threatens the very existence of humanity  
9. Although the major effects of climate change may not happen in my life time, it is still a 
grave threat to humanity  
10. Climate change may affect the environment, but it does not threaten human existence* 
 
Climate Change Mitigation Threat Scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
1. Attempts by governments to slow or reduce the effects of climate change will destabilise 
the economy. 
2. The current economic system will not be threatened by policies to address climate change, 
such as caps on pollution and carbon taxes.* 
3. Moving from a fossil fuel-based energy system to renewables and clean energy will disrupt 
the existing social order. 
4. The current way of life will be negatively affected by attempts by governments to slow or 
reduce the effects of climate change  
5. Policies to address climate change such as caps on pollution and carbon taxes will not 
endanger the economy*  
6. Policies to address climate change (such as caps on pollution and carbon taxes) threatens 
the current market-based economic system. 
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7. Moving away from the use of fossil-fuels and toward the use of renewable and clean 
energy will not disrupt the existing social order* 
8. Seriously addressing climate change at the government level threatens the foundations of 
the existing economic system. 
9. Dealing with climate change by decreasing the use of fossil fuels will result in economic 
instability 
10. The current market-based economic system will not be threatened by addressing climate 
change* 
11. Attempts to address climate change by governments will not affect economic stability* 
12. Moving from a fossil fuel-based energy system to renewables and clean energy will cause 
economic instability. 
 
Climate Change Denial Scale (Modified scale based on Häkkinen & Akrami, 2014)  
7pt scale. (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
1. I am not convinced that the Earth's climate has warmed up over the last century. 
2. I find it hard to believe that the earth's climate is really changing. 
3. My opinion is that Earth's climate shows a pronounced increase in temperature* 
4. I believe that climate change is occurring* 
5. Climate change is a result of human activities such as burning fossil fuels* 
6. Climate change is just a result of natural variation in the climate. 
7. Warming of the climate on earth is not due to human influence. 
8. Human activity is causing changes in the climate.* 
9. Climate change will affect the Earth negatively.* 
10. My opinion is that we will not even notice the effects of climate change. 
11. The so-called "climate threat" is exaggerated. 
12. Life on Earth will be seriously impacted by climate change.* 
13. I do not believe that scientists are in agreement on the issue of climate change. 
14. I believe that there is enough scientific evidence to confirm the changes in Earth's 
climate.* 
15. I think the evidence for climate change is far too weak. 
16. Scientific evidence overwhelmingly supports the notion that the climate is changing* 
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Economic System Justification Scale (Jost & Thomson, 2000) (1= strongly disagree, 9 = 
strongly agree)  
1. If people work hard, they almost always get what they want 
2. The existence of widespread economic differences does not mean that they are 
inevitable* 
3. Laws of nature are responsible for differences in wealth in society 
4. There are many reasons to think that the economic system is unfair* 
5. It is virtually impossible to eliminate poverty 
6. Poor people are not essentially different from rich people* 
7. Most people who don’t get ahead in our society should not blame the system; 
they have only themselves to blame 
8. Equal distribution of resources is a possibility for our society* 
9. Social class differences reflect differences in the natural order of things 
10. Economic differences in the society reflect an illegitimate distribution of 
resources* 
11. There will always be poor people, because there will never be enough jobs for 
everybody 
12. Economic positions are legitimate reflections of people’s achievements  
13. If people wanted to change the economic system to make things equal, they 
could* 
14. Equal distribution of resources is unnatural 
15. It is unfair to have an economic system which produces extreme wealth and 
extreme poverty at the same time* 
16. There is no point in trying to make incomes more equal 
17. There are no inherent differences between rich and poor; it is purely a matter of 
the circumstances into which you are born* 
 
Conservative Identification with a Psychological Group Scale (Mael & Tetrick, 1992, as 
cited in Devine, 2014).  
7pt scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
1. When someone criticises conservatives, it feels like a personal insult. 
2. I’m very interested in what others think of conservatives. 
3. When I talk about conservatives, I usually say “we” rather than “they”. 
4. Conservatives’ successes are my successes.  
5. When someone praises conservatives, it feels like a personal compliment. 
6. I act like a conservative person to a great extent. 
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7. If a story in the media criticised conservatives, I’d feel embarrassed. 
8. I don’t act like a typical conservative person. * 
9. I have a number of qualities typical of conservative people. 
10. The limitations associated with conservative people apply to me also. 
 
Liberal Identification with a Psychological Group Scale (Mael & Tetrick, 1992, as cited 
in Devine, 2014).  
7pt scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
1. When someone criticises liberals, it feels like a personal insult. 
2. I’m very interested in what others think of liberals. 
3. When I talk about liberals, I usually say “we” rather than “they”. 
4. Liberals’ successes are my successes.  
5. When someone praises liberals, it feels like a personal compliment. 
6. I act like a liberal person to a great extent. 
7. If a story in the media criticised liberals, I’d feel embarrassed. 
8. I don’t act like a typical liberal person* 
9. I have a number of qualities typical of liberal people. 
10. The limitations associated with liberal people apply to me also. 
 
General System Justification Scale (Kay & Jost, 2003) (1= strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree)  
1. In general, you find society to be fair. 
2. In general, the American political system operates as it should. 
3. American society needs to be radically restructured.* 
4. America is the best country in the world to live in. 
5. Most policies serve the greater good. 
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6. Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness. 
7. Our society is getting worse every year.* 
8. Society is set up so that people usually get what they deserve. 
 
Democratic System Justification Scale - modified (Rutto, Russo & Mosso, 2013) (1= 
strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree)  
1. In general, I believe that our democratic system is fair 
2. The American political system needs to be radically restructured* 
3. Our democratic system is the best possible 
4. Politics assists us to move forward 
5. Political parties represent the different values of society 
6. Today politicians act more in favour of lobby groups than of the citizens* 
 
